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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE KIDNEY DONOR SCHOLARSHIP ACT: HOW COLLEGE
SCHOLARSHIPS CAN PROVIDE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR KIDNEY
DONATION WHILE PRESERVING ALTRUISTIC MEANING
JAKE LINFORD*

I. INTRODUCTION
When I was a child, my father sold several hundred acres of property,
some of it to the local county government, and some of it to a company that
mines phosphate. After I graduated from college, I remember walking with
Dad through one of these parcels of property that he no longer owned,
located directly behind his house. The property had been in our family for
three generations, and I viewed it as part of an inviolable whole. I remarked
that it was sad to think that this property was no longer in our family. He
bristled at the statement, and offered the following rejoinder: “that property
put you through school.”
I reflected then that my affection for the property was not stronger than
my attachment to and dependence on my undergraduate degree and the
opportunities that it afforded me. When viewed through the lens of my
emotional attachment to the property as a symbol of our family, it seemed
invaluable, in the sense of something to which a price should not be
attached. When I looked at the property through the lens of the
opportunities it afforded, it took on a different meaning—it became a
symbol of my father’s sacrifice to meet his children’s needs. The property
was no longer “invaluable,” while the education its sale had enabled had
become so.
I contrast this story with one of meaningless loss, also from my father’s
life. When Dad was fifteen years old, he was injured while riding an inflated
inner tube down a snowy hill. The accident damaged his kidney, which had
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and the University of Chicago Legal Scholarship Workshop for excellent feedback and incisive
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generosity in reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this article.
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to be removed. For the past forty-two years, Dad has lived with one kidney.
The loss of the kidney has not seriously impacted his health. In fact, he
played for the Wyoming High School Class A state championship basketball
team during his senior year. There is no symbolism attached to Dad’s lost
kidney, other than the lesson that inner tubes are not a safe mode of
transportation down snowy hills.
I saw a connection between these stories as I considered the shortfall in
the supply of transplantable kidneys in the United States. The current
procurement regime cannot meet the need for kidneys, and the burden of
these shortages falls disproportionately on people of color. In 2006,
approximately 4,400 people died while waiting for a kidney.1 On average,
a Black person waits nearly twice as long for a kidney as a White person.2
The status quo is unacceptable both on moral and economic grounds.
Those who wait for a donated kidney are relegated to a limbo of dialysis,
cut off from many productive endeavors. In addition to the personal losses,
the economic costs of dialysis are also significant.
The kidney shortfall has inspired intense discussion regarding how best
to address shortages in an equitable and ethical manner.3 Two prominent
scholars highlight the seemingly unconquerable gulf between two theoretical
poles. Dr. Arthur Matas, a prominent transplant surgeon, argues that
“barring kidney sales is tantamount to sentencing some patients to death.”4
Dr. Francis Delmonico, a Harvard University professor of medicine—and,
until recently, the president of the United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS)—fears a system of commodification would exploit poor, vulnerable,
and unhealthy populations, and cause altruistic donation to “wither away.”5
This article responds to a challenge issued by Michele Goodwin to
bridge the gulf between these theoretical poles by moving from a discussion
of whether or not to commodify to a discussion of what degree of
commodification might be acceptable.6 The question that remains in the

1. Laura Meckler, How Much Is that Kidney in the Window?: A Radical Idea Goes
Mainstream—Selling Human Organs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 1B.
2. MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 45
(2006) [hereinafter GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS] (reporting that in 2003, Blacks waited an
average of 1,891 days compared to 840 days for Whites).
3. See, e.g., Rob Stein, States Revising Organ-Donation Law: Critics Fear Measure May
Not Go Far Enough to Protect Donors, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2007, at Al.
4. Meckler, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Michele Goodwin, Private Ordering and Intimate Spaces: Why the Ability to Negotiate
is Non-Negotiable, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1367, 1369, 1384 (2007) [hereinafter Goodwin,
Private Ordering] (arguing that until society begins discussing what degree of commodification
is socially acceptable, organ donation regimes are unlikely to fully incorporate all members of
society).
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breach between these positions is whether a limited or regulated system of
commodification—what scholars have referred to as “rewarded gifting” as
distinguishable from “rampant commercialism”7—might increase the supply
of transplantable kidneys while preserving altruistic giving and protecting
potentially vulnerable populations from exploitation. This article proposes
an academic scholarship incentive8 for living kidney donors as a means of
addressing the shortage of kidneys in a way that protects the best aspects of
the current altruistic regime.9 While a scholarship incentive has been
mentioned as a way of incentivizing increased donation,10 this article is the
first to seriously examine whether a scholarship incentive could be capable
of preserving altruistic giving while reducing the current shortfall in kidney
procurement.
The scholarship program envisioned would provide tuition, fees, and
living expenses at a four-year university or a job-training program to which
the donor-scholar qualifies for admission. The program would be limited to
participants age eighteen or older. The program’s informed consent
requirements will mirror those currently in use at organ transplant centers,
and all information necessary to insure donor capacity to provide informed
consent would be communicated to the donor-scholar only after the donorscholar reaches the age of eighteen. Finally, each donor-scholar would
have access to a health care professional unaffiliated with a recipient group
and would have access to aftercare provided by the program.
This article identifies four problems with the current system for procuring
kidneys, and argues in Part II that a scholarship incentive for living donors
should provide positive solutions for each problem area. First, any system
of commodification must address the effect of commodification on altruistic
giving.11 Altruism purists hold that altruistic giving will wither in the presence
of a market system, and that there will be a resulting net loss in kidneys
procured for donation.
This article addresses the concern that a
commodification regime will necessarily lead to a drop off in altruistic

7. A.S. Daar, Rewarded Gifting and Rampant Commercialism in Perspective: Is There a
Difference?, in ORGAN REPLACEMENT THERAPY: ETHICS, JUSTICE, COMMERCE 181, 182 (Walter
Land & John B. Dossetor eds., 1991).
8. This article will look primarily at the implications of an academic scholarship to a
four-year institution. The program could easily be adapted to job training in a variety of
nonacademic settings, an option also provided for soldiers under the G.I. Bill.
9. While the scholarship program could work equally well for the donation of a lobe of
liver, for the sake of simplicity, the article deliberately limits the discussion to a kidney
scholarship.
10. Michele Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics & Private Ordering, 49 ARIZ. L. REV.
599, 617 (2007) [hereinafter Goodwin, The Body Market].
11. See id. at 632-33 (noting the current debate among scholars regarding the effect of
developing a framework that advocates organ commodification while preserving altruism).
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donations by reviewing a series of attitudinal surveys which suggest that the
less an incentive resembles a direct payment, the more palatable it becomes
to society in general, and the more likely it is to increase, rather than
decrease, the supply of kidneys suitable for transplant. Second, living
donation can ameliorate some of the logistical issues created by relying on
deceased donation.12 Third, contrary to the presumptions of some
academics, a system of living donation should reduce the incidence of
diseased kidneys procured for transplant. Finally, the scholarship program
can and should be structured to reduce the current racial imbalance
experienced on organ waitlists.
The article then addresses arguments frequently raised against
commodification and argues that the proposed scholarship incentive can
effectively respond to these arguments. In Part III, the article explains how
the scholarship incentive as conceived occupies a rhetorical position which
suggests that it presents an acceptable mode of rewarded gifting. Because
scholarships are understood as manifestations of altruism, the scholarship
incentive can be designed to preserve spaces where altruistic giving will be
both desirable and essential. This Part also analyzes ethnographies of
altruists, including kidney and liver donors, to argue that the “fragility” of
altruism suggested by some authors is more imagined than real. An
examination of the nature of altruistic giving suggests that donors currently
willing to donate under the exclusively altruistic regime will not be
discouraged from donation by a regime of rewarded gifting like the
scholarship incentive.
In Part IV, the article addresses issues of coercion. Critics assert that the
commodification of kidneys threatens to coerce the participation of poor
and underprivileged populations, even when donation is not in the best
interest of the potential donor. These critics ignore the coercive pressures
already present in the current allocation regime, which pushes American
need for kidneys into foreign markets where American law cannot effectively
reach to protect underprivileged donor populations. While a raw cash-forkidneys regime might create problematic coercive pressure, the proposed
scholarship incentive can mitigate the coercive power of commodification.
Research into brain morphology and decisional heuristics suggests that the
delayed nature of the proposed scholarship incentive will protect the
decisional capacity of donor populations in a way that an upfront cash
payment cannot. Part IV concludes by arguing that members of the

12. This article uses the term deceased donation throughout as a blanket term to indicate
two types of cadaveric donations: those contemplated by the donor before death and
committed to through a method like a donor card, and those where the family makes a
decision at the time of death to donate a deceased donor’s kidneys without any indication that
donation was the donor’s desire.
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emerging adult population—individuals aged 18 to 25—have sufficient
decisional capacity to make informed choices about whether to donate, and
that the scholarship program would not impair that capacity.
Finally, in Part V, the article discusses the obstacles to the scholarship
proposal embedded in the current statutory regime, and argues that the
treatment of athletic scholarships provides a workable analogy for the
proposed scholarship incentive for kidney donation. The article then
concludes by suggesting a more directed study of public attitudes towards a
hypothetical scholarship, and eventually, a pilot scholarship program,
allowing society to measure whether the potential benefits suggested in this
article can be realized.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT ORGAN PROCUREMENT PROCESS
Measurable economic benefits would result from reducing the number
of patients on dialysis and the scholarship incentive can provide
commensurate economic benefits to the recipients of higher education. The
first problem with the current system of kidney procurement and allocation is
that there are simply not enough kidneys to meet the demand.
A.

Lack of Kidneys

In 2008, 4,410 persons died while waiting for a transplantable kidney.13
There were 79,749 potential recipients waiting for a kidney on May 11,
2009, and approximately 74,000 in 2007.14 In 2008, there were 16,517
donor kidneys recovered: 5,967 kidneys from living donors, and 10,500
kidneys from deceased donors.15 Need outstripped supply by roughly
57,000 kidneys in 2007, and that gap grows each year. Those waiting for
kidneys are usually consigned to dialysis as a stopgap measure of
preserving their lives by mechanically executing part of the cleaning function
that healthy kidneys provide. Dialysis is a measure so unattractive that some
Americans with the financial wherewithal avoid the wait by going to foreign

13. ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, NATIONAL DATA, at
www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp? (choose “Waiting List Removals” and “Kidney,” then
select “Death Removals by State by Year”) (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (referring to the chart “All
States” under the year “2007”). The data contained on OPTN’s website is updated on a daily
basis and subject to change based on future data submissions or corrections. Id.
14. ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, DATA, at www.optn.org/data/
(last visited May 11, 2009) (“Waiting List Candidates as of Today - Kidney”).
15. ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, NATIONAL DATA, at
www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp? (choose “Transplant,” select “Kidney,” then choose
“Deceased Donor Transplants in the U.S. by State,” and “Deceased Donors Recovered in the
U.S. by Donor Age”) (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
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countries. Unfortunately, the residents of those countries are potentially
more vulnerable to predation by the unscrupulous and criminal.16
Dialysis costs between $60,000 and $90,000 per year.17 The average
life span of a patient on dialysis is five years,18 thus, unless a donor kidney is
located, the average cost of dialysis per patient is approximately
$372,000.19 The estimated cost of transplant surgery, and five years of the
immunosuppressant drugs necessary to keep the recipient’s body from
rejecting the new kidney, is approximately $124,000.20 The rough net
savings over the five-year period is $248,000, or $49,600 per year.
That simple economic picture doesn’t take into account the quality of life
costs of dialysis. Scholars estimate that the social welfare costs of dialysis
are over $1 billion; “many (or most) of those patients experience energy
loss, nausea, weakness, hypertension, bone disease, infections,
atherosclerotic disease, and other problems that emanate from the
treatment itself.”21 Those numbers do not take into account the physical
and emotional toll on patients, many of whom cannot work,22 and who as a
group are twice as likely as non-dialysis patients to commit suicide.23
It is difficult to argue against the benefits of getting patients off dialysis
and back to a normal life by providing a kidney. Herein lays the basic
proposal of this article: offer educational scholarships as an incentive to
those who make a living donation of a kidney.24 If handled correctly, the

16. See, e.g., Karen Russo, U.S. Couple in Kidney Racket Claims Ignorance: India Will
Detain N.Y. Pair Until They Provide Information on Shady Enterprise, ABC NEWS, Jan. 30,
2008, at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Story?id=4217154&page=1 (last visited Apr. 9,
2009) (reporting that an American couple was detained by Indian authorities for using the
services of an illegal kidney racket whereby donors were forced to donate at gunpoint).
17. See Betsy Rogers, Goodnight, Dialysis, WASH. U. IN ST. LOUIS SCHOOL OF MED.
OUTLOOK, at http://outlook.wustl.edu/summer2002/dialysis.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009)
(noting that in-center dialysis costs $70,000 a year); Goodwin, The Body Market, supra note
10, at 634.
18. Sahar Kajbaf, Graham Nichol & Deborah Zimmerman, Cancer Screening and Life
Expectancy of Canadian Patients with Kidney Failure, 17 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS
TRANSPLANTATION 1786, 1786 (2002).
19. Arthur J. Matas & Mark Schnitzler, Payment for Living Donor (Vendor) Kidneys: A
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216, 218 (2003).
20. Id. at 218 tbl.1 (illustrating an estimated cost of $72,693 for the first year after
transplantation and $12,814 for maintenance the following two years thereafter).
21. DAVID L. KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A
PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM 35, 68 (2002).
22. Id. at 35.
23. Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures
Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 37-38 n.110 (1989).
24. While the program could also provide a scholarship to the family of a donor who
commits to deceased donation in case of accident, this article deals primarily with the benefits
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scholarship program could encourage sufficient donation to meet the
current need, as well as provide a sustainable supply of kidneys for future
needs. The average cost of tuition at a four-year private institution was
$29,307 for the 2007-2008 academic year.25 In-state tuition at a state
college is significantly more affordable.26 The savings of transplantation
over dialysis could easily pay that amount and still provide substantial
savings to the party (generally Medicaid) that would originally have been
obligated to pay for dialysis.
To briefly outline the important features of the program: the scholarship
incentive would pay tuition, fees, and housing for students who make a
living donation of a kidney. The program would not qualify a particular
donor for a particular school, but would pay for educational expenses at a
college, university, or trade school that has accepted the donor.
The program would be limited to students eighteen years of age or
older. All medical information necessary to meet informed consent
requirements must be provided after the donor has reached eighteen years
of age. Donors would receive consultation with a nephrologist unconnected
with the recipient’s transplant team to assure that there is no undue pressure
to complete the donation process. All donors would receive comprehensive
psychological screening, as well as screening regarding family support
structure and general health. Potential donors who are considered a poor
match for donation due to psychological, health or other factors will not be
selected for the program. However, evaluating physicians would not
consider an interest in the educational scholarship grounds to find a donor
unfit.
B.

Could Scholarships Help?

The scholarship program will only be worth the effort if it will increase
the net supply of kidneys available for transplant. This requires more than
simply encouraging donors to donate, but requires some evidence that a
financial incentive like a scholarship will not discourage the altruism that
fuels the current procurement system. Several scholars argue that it is
unlikely that any incentive program will produce a net increase in kidney

of living donation. As discussed in Part II.C and D infra, there are logistical reasons to think
that living donation is preferable to deceased donation.
25. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. SCI., MINI-DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS 2008, at 53 (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009021.pdf (last
visited Apr. 9, 2009).
26. The average cost of in-state tuition at four-year public institutions for the 2007-2008
academic year was $12, 944. Id.
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donation.27 It is difficult to demonstrate empirically that any program of
commodification will encourage Americans to donate, although there is
some evidence that citizens of foreign countries who are economically
desperate will donate a kidney, often for what Americans would consider to
be minimal compensation.28 This part of the article reviews a number of
attitudinal surveys conducted among various groups. The overview of these
studies suggests that the correct incentive program could produce a net
increase in donation. These studies also suggest that incentives which are
structured more like a reciprocal gift and less like a direct market transaction
are viewed more favorably by both the general public and by groups more
directly related to the procurement process. This article also recognizes the
general limit of attitudinal studies. While scholars have found a limited
correlation between what respondents say they will do in a hypothetical
situation and what they decide when faced with an actual decision,29
“attitudes are not synonymous with behavior.”30 A second limit presented by
the attitudinal studies reviewed is that the majority of them inquire into
attitudes regarding deceased donation, and thus may have limited
descriptive power in predicting responses to an incentive for living donation
like the proposed scholarship program. Finally, only one study offers the
option of a scholarship incentive to respondents, and that study fails to
provide any details regarding the percentage of respondents favorably
disposed.31

27. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Prottas, Buying Human Organs—Evidence That Money Doesn’t
Change Everything, 53 TRANSPLANTATION 1371, 1371 (1992) (reporting on the results of a
1986 attitudinal study in which seventy-eight percent of “those surveyed reject the idea that
families of donors ought to be paid for granting permission” to have organs donated).
28. Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a Kidney in
India, 288 JAMA 1589, 1590, 1591 (2002) (reporting that 305 residents of Chennai, India,
received an average of $1,070 for selling one kidney). It should be noted, however, that this
amount is more than the average yearly income in India of $950. See The World Bank, India
at a Glance, available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/ind_aag.pdf (last visited Apr. 9,
2009) (reporting that in India the average yearly income in 2007 was $950).
29. See Monica A. Landolt et al., They Talk the Talk: Surveying Attitudes and Judging
Behavior About Living Anonymous Kidney Donation, 76 TRANSPLANTATION 1437, 1437-38
(2003) (citing two broad reviews of psychological literature which find a limited correlation
between individuals’ reported intentions and their actual behaviors).
30. Stephen J. Kraus, Attitudes and the Prediction of Behavior: A Meta-Analysis of the
Empirical Literature, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 58, 71 (1995).
31. Raymond L. Horton & Patricia J. Horton, Improving the Current System for Supplying
Organs for Transplantation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 175, 177-78 & n.2 (1993)
(reporting—without providing details—that in a study of 465 adults in an unspecified “local
community,” both the general respondent population and registered organ donors favored an
option where organ donors would be provided with “a voucher that could be used for college
tuition or job training of heirs” over a cash incentive).
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The attitudinal studies reviewed break down into several categories. The
largest category is comprised of nine separate attitudinal studies where
respondents were randomly selected from the general population. In five of
these studies, respondents indicated that incentives that were in-kind (like a
payment toward unpaid, uninsured medical expenses) or non-monetary (like
donor recognition or priority placement on the organ waitlist) were generally
better received than monetary incentives (like cash in exchange for donating
a kidney).32
A smaller pilot study by John H. Evans33 concluded that the type of
incentive matters in the realm of kidney donation because when it comes to
32. See Leonieke Kranenberg et al., Public Survey of Financial Incentives for Kidney
Donation, 23 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 1039, 1040 tbl.1, 1041 (2007)
(reporting, from an internet questionnaire of 550 paid Dutch respondents, that while financial
incentives for kidney donations were generally viewed unfavorably on a five-point Likert
scale—46.6% of respondents rated them unfavorably or very unfavorably, compared with
25% that rated them favorably or very favorably—respondents who responded positively to
incentives favored lifetime health insurance (66.2%) over a lump-sum cash payment to donors
(33.8%)); J.D. Jasper et al., The Public’s Attitudes Toward Incentives for Organ Donation, 31
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2181, 2181-82 (1999) (reporting in a study of 300 prospective
jurors at a county courthouse in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, who served as respondents in
exchange for a candy bar, that “[p]olicies offering in-kind incentives (e.g., a $1,500 payment
toward unpaid, uninsured medical expenses) or nonmonetary incentives (e.g., donor
recognition) were generally considered more appropriate than policies offering monetary
incentives (e.g., $1,500 in cash).”); T.J. Cossé et al., Public Feelings About Financial
Incentives for Donation and Concern About Incurring Expenses Due to Donation in One US
City, 29 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3263, 3263 (1997) (reporting that in a three year telephone
survey of adults in the metro Richmond, Virginia area, more respondents favored a
contribution to funeral expenses for the families of deceased donors (thirty-five percent agreed
or strongly agreed on a 5-point Likert-type scale in 1994; thirty-five percent in 1995; and
forty-percent in 1996) than favored a cash payment to families making a donation of a
deceased relative’s organs (thirty-two percent agreed or strongly agreed in 1994; twenty-six
percent in 1995; and thirty percent in 1996)); Thomas G. Peters et al., Organ Donors and
Nondonors: An American Dilemma, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2419, 2421 tbl.2 (1996)
(reporting results of a 1992 telephone survey of randomly selected respondents conducted by
UNOS, where respondents indicated that they were very interested or somewhat interested in
the following incentive options: (1) preferred donor status (fifty-nine percent); (2) $2,000
toward funeral expenses (fifty-four percent); (3) $2,000 charitable contribution (fifty-two
percent); (4) limited life insurance (forty-six percent); and (5) $2,000 cash payment (thirty-five
percent)). The Peters survey also reports that younger respondents were most favorably
disposed towards the cash incentive of any age group (fifty-three percent of respondents aged
eighteen to twenty-four indicated they were very interested or somewhat interested in the cash
incentive, compared with thirty-five percent of respondents overall). Id. at 2421 tbl.2.
33. John H. Evans, Commodifying Life? A Pilot Study of Opinions Regarding Financial
Incentives for Organ Donation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1003, 1010-14 (2003)
(measuring the responses of eighty-six students in a graduate level health policy class to a
variety of end-of-life vignettes where respondents must rate on a ten point scale—where one is
“absolutely not” and ten is “absolutely”—whether a hypothetical family should terminate life
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commodifying the products of the body, “a dollar is not a dollar . . . [and]
[p]eople tend to consider dollars that circulate within the same institutional
sphere to have the same moral status.”34
Other general population attitudinal studies report a general favorable
response to incentives for organ donation in the abstract.35 Two Gallup
polls, the first taken in 199336 and the second in 2005,37 indicate an
increasing willingness on the part of survey respondents to consent to

support for a family member, and the family is faced with one of four hypothetical incentives:
(1) $2,000 for funeral expenses; (2) a $25,000 voucher for the patient’s medical expenses;
(3) $25,000 in cash for the family to use as they wish; or (4) the altruistic status quo). Evans
reports a positive correlation between a variable in the vignettes increasing amounts of
medical debt for the family with an increased strength of recommendation that the family
terminate life support. Id. at 1019 (stating, based on the correlation between a growing debt
variable and the recommendation to end life, that “[h]aving a health care system where
people ultimately are responsible for their bills is enough to make people evaluate the price of
keeping someone alive.”). Evans found that the $25,000 cash incentive does not encourage
respondents to recommend ending life support, but that the two voucher plans actually
increased the frequency with which respondents indicated that the family should not terminate
life support. Id. at 1019-20. Evans found a statistically significant negative correlation
between increasing debt and the health insurance voucher, which he concludes indicates a
discounting of the debt when presented with the medical bill voucher, but not for the other
incentives. Id. at 1021-22.
34. Id. at 1022 (internal citations omitted). Evans concludes that the medical bill voucher
is commensurate, or from the same sphere as the mounting debt from medical bills, and that
there is not a statistically significant correlation between cash payments or funeral vouchers
and the debt variable because they provide “fungibility outside of the medical sphere.” Id. at
1022. Evans also posits that “equating the surgical removal of organs with an object outside
of the medical sphere—such as the college education the family could buy with the $25,000
hypothetical payment—violates our sense of the sacredness of these institutional boundaries.”
Id. Evans’s study does not measure responses to a scholarship voucher, and it is unclear
whether responses would be different were the respondents considering vignettes regarding a
decision to make a living donation of a kidney.
35. See A. Guttmann & R.D. Guttmann, Sale of Kidneys for Transplantation: Attitudes of
the Health-Care Profession and the Public, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2108, 2108 (1992)
(reporting that members of the Canadian public and medical profession interviewed reported
that forty percent of respondents indicated that a hypothetical dialysis patient of Canadian
heritage should be allowed to purchase a kidney, while forty-nine percent indicated that a
hypothetical patient of Indian heritage should be able to buy a kidney).
36. THE GALLUP ORG., INC. FOR THE PARTNERSHIP FOR ORGAN DONATION, BOSTON,
MASSACHUSETTS, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC’S ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGAN DONATION AND
TRANSPLANTATION: A SURVEY (1993) [hereinafter GALLUP 1993].
37. THE GALLUP ORG. FOR THE DIVISION OF TRANSPLANTATION HEALTH RESOURCES AND
SERVICES ADMIN., 2005 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION ATTITUDES AND
BEHAVIORS 3-4 & tbl. 1 (2005), available at ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/organdonor/survey2005.pdf
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009) [hereinafter GALLUP 2005] (reporting in tbl.1 the results of 2,341
telephone interviews measuring the attitudes of the public regarding organ donation).
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donate their organs38 or the organs of a deceased family member39 if
offered a financial incentive. The 2005 Gallup poll also indicated an
apparent polarization, with more respondents indicating that financial
incentives would make them less likely to donate increasing over time (8.9%
reporting they were less likely to donate their own or a family member’s
organs in 2005 vs. 5% reporting they were less likely to donate their own
organs and 8% indicating they were less likely to donate a family member’s
organs in 1993).40 The Gallup polls do not distinguish between types of
financial incentives.
Two studies compare the attitudes of next-of-kin who chose to donate a
deceased relative’s organs with next-of-kin who were approached but chose
not to donate. A study by James R. Rodrigue and his associates41 reports
that next-of-kin donors contemplating a hypothetical generic financial
incentive to encourage kidney donation indicate a slight decrease in their
willingness to donate,42 while next-of-kin nondonors indicate a slight
increase in the willingness to donate.43 Rodrigue and his associates
expressed some concern that financial incentives offered to next-of-kin were
not likely to lead to increased deceased donation rates, but that they might
well increase participation by donors themselves.44 It should be noted,
however, that the Rodrigue study did not distinguish between financial
incentives, and that its ability to predict the response to a particular incentive
is therefore limited. Laura Siminoff and Mary Beth Mercer also conducted a
study of next-of-kin, finding moderate levels of approval for a variety of

38. In 2005, 16.6% of survey respondents indicated “they would be ‘more likely’ to
donate their own organs if paid an incentive,” an increase of 4.6% over a response to a
similar question in the 1993 Gallup poll. Id. at iv, 23.
39. Respondents also indicated an increased willingness to donate a family member’s
organs upon death if provided with an incentive (reporting 18.7% in 2005 vs. 12.0% in
1993). Id. at 23.
40. Id. at 24 fig. 12 (“Financial Incentives and Deceased Organ Donation, 1993-2005”).
41. James R. Rodrigue et al., Attitudes Toward Financial Incentives, Donor Authorization,
and Presumed Consent Among Next-of-Kin Who Consented vs. Refused Organ Donation, 81
TRANSPLANTATION 1249, 1250-51 & tbl.1 (2006) (reporting the results of a telephone survey
of 561 next-of-kin recently asked to consent to deceased donation of a family member’s
organs: 348 donors and 213 non-donors).
42. Among next-of-kin donors, 84.5% (n = 294) reported that the incentives would make
no difference, while 6% (21 / 344 = 6%) (n = 21) reported they would be more likely to
donate, and 9.5% (33 / 348 = 9.5%) (n = 33) reported they would be less likely to donate.
Id. at 1252 tbl.2.
43. For next-of-kin non-donors, 67.6% (n = 144) reported no effect, while 19.2% (41 /
213 = 19.2%) (n = 41) reported they were more likely to donate, and 13.1% (28 / 213 =
13.1%) (n = 28) indicated they would be even less likely to donate. Id. at 1252 tbl.2.
44. Id. at 1254.
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incentives.45 The Siminoff study did not attempt to measure whether the
donors’ or non-donors’ decisions would have changed in light of donation,
but did ask respondents whether they would have been offended/insulted by
an offer to pay funeral expenses, and found a limited negative reaction on
the part of next-of-kin respondents.46
Three other studies compare the responses of registered organ donors
to the general population and reach decidedly mixed results. A 2001 study
conducted by Dr. Cindy Bryce measured the response to specific programs
providing financial benefits to the families of deceased donors.47 The
majority of respondents reported that benefits would have no effect on
them.48 For both registered organ donors and those not registered as
donors, more respondents reported that financial incentives would increase
the likelihood that they would donate than reported that financial incentives
for their families would make them less likely to donate.49 Consistent with
the general population studies referenced above,50 respondents were more
comfortable with benefits which function more as reimbursements or as a
means of offsetting the costs associated with the death of a loved one and

45. Laura A. Siminoff & Mary Beth Mercer, Public Policy, Public Opinion, and Consent for
Organ Donation, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 377, 377, 380 tbl.2 (2001) (reporting
on a study of over 600 next-of-kin who had been asked to consent to organ donation from
400 related acute care patients, and the attitudes of the respondents regarding three
incentives to encourage kidney donation: (1) “[f]amilies who agree to donate should be given
money to pay for funeral expenses” (31.6% agree); (2) “[p]eople who have signed a donor
card should receive an organ transplant before others do” (25.4% agree); and (3) “[t]he
government should provide money to families who agree to donate organs” (22.2% agree)).
46. In response to the funeral benefit, 25% of respondents indicated they would not have
been offended/insulted. Id. at 382 tbl.3 (“Families’ Attitudes about Funeral Expense
Incentive). 20.3% mentioned that they "[w]ould have appreciated the offer,” and 23.8%
indicated they would have been insulted. Id. Some respondents (16.9%) indicated a belief
that other people might appreciate the offer. Id. A smaller percentage (17.4%) of the
respondents—and perhaps an overlapping portion, although the study does not make this
clear—indicated that “[o]rgan donation should not involve “the selling of organs or be a
business transaction[.]” Id. 8.7% reported that “[f]inancial help for funeral expenses should
not be offered[.]” Id.
47. C.L. Bryce et al., Do Incentives Matter? Providing Benefits to Families of Organ
Donors, 5 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2999, 3000-01 (2005) (reporting on the attitudes of 971
randomly sampled adults from Pennsylvania households asked to offer their opinions on
incentives in general and to evaluate five specific programs on a 5-point Likert scale, ordered
here from the most to least favorably received: (1) medical benefits; (2) funeral expenses; (3)
travel lodging expenses; (4) charitable contributions; and (5) direct payment)).
48. Between seventy-one percent and seventy-six percent of respondents reported that
benefits would have neither a positive nor negative effect, depending on the benefit. Id. at
3001.
49. Id. at 3001-02.
50. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
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less comfortable with direct cash compensation.51 Still, even in the least
favored category, direct payment, more respondents indicated an increased
willingness to donate in light of financial incentives than indicated the
opposite reaction.52 The study evidenced no indication that financial
incentives were likely to result in a net loss in the supply of kidneys.
The Bryce study measured the response to five types of posthumous
benefits, ordered here from those which reported the largest net
improvement in respondents’ attitudes toward donation to those that
provided the smallest net improvement: medical expenses, funeral benefits,
travel/lodging expenses, charitable contributions, and direct payment.53
One noteworthy finding from the Bryce study is that respondents
reported that others were much more likely to be affected by financial
benefits than they themselves were.54 While the study is not conclusive on
this pint, it would not be surprising if respondents underreported the
influence of financial benefits on themselves out of a desire to appear
altruistic, or a general discomfort with admitting to the effect of financial
benefits on their willingness to donate. If that were the case, then the higher
estimated influence of financial benefits on others is more in line with actual
effects we might see under an incentive system.
A study by J.D. Jasper55 reported that while a small number of registered
donors indicated they would not donate under specific incentive systems, the
number of non-donors indicating they would donate if offered an incentive
51. Those indicating that the benefit would have an effect more frequently indicated an
increased willingness to donate, measured by the percentage more willing to donate less the
percentage less willing to donate. Medical benefits reported the largest net increase, (twentythree percent), while even direct payment showed a net increase (nine percent) in the
percentage of respondents more willing to donate over the percentage of respondents less
willing to donate. Bryce et al., supra note 47, at 3002. A subset of the respondents identified
themselves as registered organ donors, and they also reported an increase in their willingness
to donate if incentives were introduced, although the direct cash incentive was less popular
with registered donors to a degree that was statistically significant (fifty percent of registered
donors registered support for the cash incentive, compared to fifty-six percent of non-donors
(p = 0.004)). Id.
52. Fifty-three percent in favor of direct payment vs. forty-two percent opposed. Id. at
3002 tbl.2 (“Respondents’ reaction to donor benefits”).
53. Id.
54. Id. For example, while seventeen percent of respondents indicated they were more
likely to donate their own deceased family member’s organs when asked if direct payment
were offered, and sixteen percent reported they were more likely to sign a donor card, fiftynine percent indicated that they thought it more likely that others would choose to donate if
direct payment were offered. Id.
55. Jasper et al., supra note 32, at 2182 (surveying respondents’ attitudes regarding the
moral appropriateness of nine different incentives on a 7-point Likert “scale ranging from 1,
‘completely inappropriate,’ to 7, ‘completely appropriate,’ with 4 being ‘neutral,’ and [also] to
decide whether they would donate under each incentive policy if it were implemented.”).
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was significantly higher than the number of donors indicating the
converse.56 Registered donors favored the altruistic status quo, and a policy
of donor recognition, while non-donors gave higher ratings to a cash
payment and a lifetime of free driver’s licenses and car tags.57
A focus group study directed by Thomas Peters reported a marked
skepticism from nondonors regarding the organ allocation system, reflected
in statements like “‘a wealthy person will get the kidney’; ‘it won’t be done
equitably’; ‘you’ll be passed over’; or ‘you’re a minority.’”58
One final study by Raymond and Patricia Horton compares the attitudes
of the general public regarding incentives for organ donation to those of
blood donors, finding that respondents who donated blood responded less
favorably both to a generic compensation program and to priority on the
organ waitlist.59 There is reason to think that the opinions of blood donors
might better reflect the opinions of the population most likely to donate an
organ, because at least one study has found a correlation between a
willingness to donate blood and a willingness to register as a kidney
donor.60
The review of the attitudinal studies suggests two general conclusions.
First, the only way to get a clear picture of whether and how financial

56. The smallest net increase in percentage of the respondent population indicating a
change in donation plans was reported for the health insurance rebate, with twenty percent of
donors indicating they would not donate, and forty percent of non-donors indicating they
would donate, while the strongest net gain was reported in funeral expenses, with six percent
of donors discouraged and forty-nine percent of non-donors encouraged. Id. at 2183 tbl.4
(“Percentages of Donors and Nondonors Indicating Whether They Would Donate Under Each
Incentive Policy”). Jasper et al. reported that “[i]f the difference between the two percentages
is used to define effectiveness, then the most effective incentives would be [a] payment toward
funeral expenses, donor recognition, and preferred status; the least effective would be [a]
rebate on health insurance and [a] federal income tax credit.” Id. at 2183.
57. Id. at 2182-83.
58. Peters et al., supra note 32, at 2421. A focus group was interviewed consisting of
fifty-one registered donors and fifty-one nondonors. Id. at 2420.
59. Horton & Horton, supra note 31, at 177-78. In a study of 465 adults in an
unspecified “local community,” 25.4% of respondents answer yes when asked “Do you think
the family of a person who becomes an organ donor should receive any form of
compensation?”, while 41.6% of respondents indicated a willingness to give organ donor
card holders “preference in obtaining an organ for an organ transplant operation.” Id. at
177. In contrast, respondents who had recently donated blood (n=217) reported lower
favorability towards both types of incentives.
Only “16.5% endorsed any form of
compensation,” while 20.9% favored preferential placement of donors on the waitlist. Id. at
177-78.
60. Philip K. T. Li et al., Attitudes About Organ and Tissue Donation Among the General
Public and Blood Donors in Hong Kong, 11 PROGRESS IN TRANSPLANTATION 98, 99 & tbl.2
(2001) (reporting that only twenty-two percent of randomly selected Hong Kong residents had
signed organ donor cards, while forty-nine percent of blood donors had done so).
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incentives would change the rate of kidney donation would be to conduct a
pilot study.61 Second, that pilot study needs to be structured as a like-kind
exchange or a non-direct benefit, instead of cash-for-kidney exchange, lest
it run the risk of providing negligible results, or even discouraging altruistic
donation. As this article argues in Part III, infra, the public may perceive the
proposed scholarship program as operating within the rhetoric of altruism, a
suitable reciprocal gift provided in return for the donor-scholar’s “gift of life”
to the recipient.
C. Scholarship Incentives Would Improve the Logistics of Kidney Allocation
Logistical factors have a measurable impact on the procurement of
kidneys for transplantation. While the proposed scholarship incentive that
encourages living donation will not necessarily solve every logistical
problem, it can mitigate the importance of two factors identified by Kieran
Healy as critical inputs to the success of deceased donation: population
density and the density of referring hospitals within the area of an Organ
Procurement Organization (OPO).62
One challenge facing the current allocation system is that in many areas
there are geographical constraints on the efficient allocation of kidneys. In
areas where OPOs service large geographical areas, it is often infeasible for
kidneys to be recovered from potential deceased donors or to get those
kidneys to a recipient in need. For example, LifeCenter Northwest Donor
Network is an OPO that covers nearly all of Washington, Idaho, Montana
and Alaska.63 Another factor that impacts the success of procurement of
cadaveric kidneys is the availability of referring hospitals to communicate
with OPOs in a short timeframe.64 While deceased donation requires a
perfect convergence of circumstances, getting a serviceable kidney from a
living donor is not a matter left to chance. Because living donation does not
require a fatal injury to the donor, it is less subject to random chance and
fortuitous circumstances (such as the manner of the donor’s death).65 Living
donation also relies on fewer intermediaries, and there are thus fewer
61. See, e.g., Bryce et al., supra note 47, at 2999 (describing how the empirical question
of the impact of incentives on donation rates has been examined by various surveys, but how
results have been inconsistent due to different methodologies and differing levels of specificity
among the previous studies).
62. KIERAN HEALY, LAST BEST GIFTS: ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR HUMAN BLOOD AND
ORGANS 61-65 (2006).
63. Id. at 61.
64. Id. at 65. “A 5 percentage point increase in the density of refer[ring hospitals] raises
the procurement rate by about a three-quarters of a point.” Id.
65. Indeed, the increased usage of safety features like motorcycle helmets and seatbelts
reduces the supply of organs through deceased donation. Lance Morrow, When One Body
Can Save Another, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 56.
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agents who can “drop the ball” in the process of getting a kidney from its
procurement site to the recipient. Indeed, with a living donor, the
procurement site is the reception site—donor and recipient will undergo
their respective procedures in the same facility. Finally, living donation is a
superior alternative to deceased donation, with superior patient and graft
survival, and reduced morbidity as expected outcomes.66
One final advantage of a scholarship incentive for living donation is that
it would prevent the family of the donor from exercising veto power over the
donor’s decision. Advocates for deceased donation note that many viable
organs are lost when the donor’s family is unwilling to follow through with
the donor’s prior decision to donate his or her organs.67 When a living
donor makes an informed decision to donate his or her organs, that choice
is much more likely to be honored.
D. The Scholarship Incentive Can Reduce the Incidence of Unhealthy
Kidneys in the Procurement Chain
A scholarship incentive that brings more living donations is likely to
reduce the frequency with which recipients receive diseased kidneys. The
use of living donors reduces time pressures associated with procurement,68
and is likely to improve the amount and reliability of information about a
donor’s health.
A lack of information about the donor can have fatal results. For
example, recently in Chicago, a deceased donor contracted the AIDS virus
and hepatitis C shortly before death. Initial tests did not reveal the recentlyacquired infections. As a result, the donor’s organs infected four transplant
recipients.69 The donor in question had admitted engaging in unspecified
high-risk behaviors, and it is unclear whether the recipients were informed of
the donor’s risky behaviors. The current shortage of kidneys increases the
risks created by limited information—while a recipient can choose to turn
down an organ, there is no guarantee that another organ will become
available.70 The compressed time frame of deceased donation exacerbates
the problem—scientists are currently trying to extend the viability of kidneys
66. Jerry McCauley et al., General Medical Evaluation of the Living Donor, in LIVING
DONOR TRANSPLANTATION 27, 27-28 (Henkie P. Tan et al. eds., 2007).
67. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's
Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 83 & n.60 (2004).
68. See infra notes 70-72.
69. Lindsey Tanner, Organ Donor Infects Four Patients with HIV, DAILY HERALD (Provo,
Utah), Nov. 14, 2007, at www.heraldextra.com/content/view/243352/3 (last visited Apr. 9,
2009).
70. Id. (reporting that while patients could reject a kidney because of concerns raised by a
doctor, “the availability of organs is such that if you pass, there’s a possibility you won’t get
one.”).
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stored outside the body from three to six days,71 but the time within which a
kidney must be placed in a solution to keep it viable can be as short as forty
minutes.72 Had the Chicago donor been a living donor, the time pressure
would have been less severe, and there likely would have been adequate
time to run secondary tests on the donor. While living donors can lie about
their health risks, and some might, mandatory tests for infections like HIV
and hepatitis can and should be part of the scholarship incentive program.
Some have argued that live donation by compensated donors will
increase incidence of diseased organs entering the procurement chain.73
Richard Titmuss, in his seminal book The Gift Relationship, argued that
markets in blood would not only drive out altruistic behavior, but would also
contaminate the blood stream, because the poor, diseased, and drug
ridden would be the only ones desperate enough to need the money, and
thus the only parties willing to provide blood.74 Titmuss reached this
conclusion by comparing the United States blood market of the late 1960s
and early 1970s with the nonmarket donation system in the United
Kingdom. Titmuss’ book was so influential that the U.S. abandoned
markets for blood in the mid-seventies, embracing an entirely altruistic
system.75 What Titmuss did not predict was that the exclusively altruistic
system exacerbated the problem of HIV-infected blood in the nation’s
supply, because the altruistic system made the blood banks feel beholden to
its donor population and unwilling to risk alienating them, even when
evidence indicated that accepting donations from some donor groups
presented an increased risk of contaminating the blood supply.
When it first became evident in the early 1980’s that AIDS, a thenunidentified contaminant, had started manifesting itself in the donated blood
supply, both blood and plasma procurement industries made missteps that
led to infections of those receiving blood transfusions. Blood banks, which
only accepted altruistic donations and thus were dependent on volunteers,
71. Michael Arndt, A Longer Shelf Life for Transplant Organs, BUS. WK., Oct. 21, 2002,
at www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_42/c3804107.htm (last visited Apr. 9,
2009).
72. See N.R. Brook & M.L. Nicholson, Kidney Transplantation from Non Heart-Beating
Donors, 1 SURGEON: J. ROYAL C. SURGEONS EDINBURGH & IRELAND 311, 311 (2003) (noting
that kidneys only remain viable for approximately forty minutes after cardiac arrest).
73. As one blogger speculated about kidney sales in the Philippines, “those who typically
sell their kidneys aren’t the type of person who’d care that much about maintaining their
health, nor do they have the ability to do so.” Organ Trade in the Philippines: Signs of the
Times?, http://health.tesstermulo.com/?p=376 (Oct. 4, 2007, 11:03 pm) (last visited Jan.
16, 2009).
74. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY 75-76 (Vintage Books 1972) (1971) (positing that the treatment of blood as a market
good leads drug addicts, alcoholics, and carriers of diseases to donate).
75. HEALY, supra note 62, at 89.
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were afraid of alienating homosexual populations—which as a group
donated blood well above the national average—realizing that doing so
was likely to result in a shortage of available blood. Thus, the blood banks
did not start screening donors, instead interpreting as inconclusive data that
suggested that homosexual populations were at higher risk of contracting
and communicating AIDS.76 Conversely, plasma banks, which paid for their
product, did not feel beholden to donor groups and screened donors once
the AIDS issue came to light, but miscalculated the risk of leaving older
supplies of plasma on the market.77
Unlike blood supply, kidney donation occurs on a smaller scale, and
each living donor can be tested for infections that put the recipient at risk.
Some may be concerned about a testing program violating the privacy of
individual donors.78 However, the scholarship incentive program can be
structured so that information revealed during testing is kept private from
those parties not directly involved with the procurement or transplantation
processes. While there may be populations that are less likely to qualify for
a kidney scholarship, that determination will not need to be made based on
stereotyping or questions about certain risk-increasing behaviors that are
also associated with certain lifestyle choices. Instead, careful tests can verify
when a donor’s kidney will present a risk to a recipient and therefore must
be kept out of the procurement chain. Finally, there is a statutory
requirement to prevent “the acquisition of organs that are infected with the
etiologic agent for acquired immune deficiency syndrome.”79 Carefully
testing living donors before donation should assist in meeting that goal.
Contrary to the fears of Titmuss and those who have embraced his research,
a market in organs will not necessarily lead to widespread contamination,
and may actually decrease the incidence of diseased organs in the
transplant chain.
E.

Unequal Distribution Across Racial Groups

If a scholarship program could effectively reduce the waitlist to zero and
provide kidneys for every patient that evidences medical need, then it would
successfully deal with one of the major problems in the current organ

76. Id. at 98-103.
77. Id. at 103-06.
78. See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old
Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1994) (explaining that some parties
take privacy seriously in order to protect themselves from having potential embarrassing
information being exposed to society).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(E) (2000).
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allocation system: disparities in allocation across racial categories.80 These
disparities are due in part to the method used to match kidneys to
recipients81 and in part to the actual discrimination that creeps into the
process of admitting prospective recipients onto the waitlists in the first
instance.82
It is not safe to assume, however, that the proposed scholarship
program would effectively reduce the waiting list to zero and then maintain
a perfect balance between donors and recipients. It is more likely that either
the scholarship system procures more kidneys, but not enough to clear out
the waiting lists, or that if the incentive is particularly effective, there will be
more donors waiting to qualify for the scholarship than there are recipients
waiting for kidneys. In either case, the scholarship incentive must deal with
the same difficult question: how to correct the racial disparity that exists in
the current organ allocation regime?
There are significant risks inherent in upsetting the current allocative
apple cart. One of the key findings by Kieran Healy is that the practices of
and economic investments by OPOs have a significant impact on the
success of providing kidneys for needy recipients.83 Unless the scholarship
program can guarantee that living donors will completely supplant
deceased donors, any new policy has to protect the efficient aspects of the
current procurement system.
Currently, kidney procurement is handled by fifty-nine OPOs84 grouped
into eleven regions. Some OPOs are net importers of organs, and others
are net exporters. Each OPO gets to set allocation rules within its service

80. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 2, at 96 (stating that “[w]ith regard to kidney
transplantation, the waiting time for Black Americans is 74% longer than for Whites.”).
81. Michele Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 353-56 (2004) [hereinafter Goodwin, Altruism’s Limits]. The end result
of UNOS’s method of matching antigens in patients has a net effect of leaving Blacks on the
waitlist for a longer period of time. See id. at 354. This is in part because matching antigens
are rarer among Blacks than Whites, and partly because Blacks have a higher rate of
sensitivity to donor antigens regardless of donor race. Id.
82. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 2, at 90-96 (discussing evidence of “green
screening” and racial stereotyping that prevents some prospective recipients from being added
to waitlists in the first instance).
83. HEALY, supra note 62, at 66-67. According to Healy, “[d]onation . . . is also strongly
affected by the resources and scope of the procurement agency. . . . [T]he individual capacity
for altruism and the social organization of procurement are not separate questions but rather
two aspects of the same process. . . . [O]rganizations create ‘contexts for giving’ [and] . . .
help create their own donor pool.” Id.
84. Nat’l Kidney Found., 25 Facts About Organ Donation and Transplantation, at
www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/fs_new/25factsorgdon&trans.cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
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area.85 While the Department of Health and Human Services has tried to
shift to a national allocation system, organs are primarily shared within
regional boundaries, in part due to the time pressures imposed by relying
predominantly on deceased donation.86 Kidneys are not allocated based
on who was first-in-time on the waiting list, but generally to the recipient
whose blood antigens best match those of the donor.87 Matching is based
on six specific human leukocyte antigens (HLAs), and where a donor and a
prospective recipient are a perfect match, an OPO is bound by rules crafted
by UNOS to provide the kidney to that recipient.88 Otherwise, the OPO
decides how to allocate kidneys within its area.
Given the importance of maintaining an infrastructure to process
donated organs, at first glance it seems reasonable to match scholarships
with OPOs. For example, if OPO #1 has 1,200 prospective recipients
waiting for kidneys, then 1,200 scholarships would be provided through
OPO #1. OPO #1 would conduct tests and make sure each donated
organ is a healthy match for a recipient from its area. If there were no
matches in the area, the OPO could then match the organ with a recipient
in its region or perhaps nationwide. In theory, tying the benefits of kidney
donation to the need in the community could be the most efficient way of
dealing with concerns about uneven distribution of kidneys. However, given
the racial inequities in the current procurement system, there is good reason
to think that administering the scholarship program through OPOs in the
same way that they have managed non-market donations will lead to
shorter lists, but with the same allocative inequities. Blacks may wait a
shorter time because of the increased number of kidneys available, but they
will still wait twice as long as White recipients.89
A second option which would capitalize on pre-existing administrative
capacity would be to manage scholarships by state, and let the state
legislatures handle the allocative details. As of May 1, 2009, 1,274
potential recipients are waiting for kidneys in the state of Washington.90

85. Jeffrey Prottas, The Politics of Transplantation, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION:
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 9 (Bethany Spielman ed., 1996).
86. The time available to get a kidney into a solution necessary to keep it viable can be
as short as forty minutes. Brook & Nicholson, supra note 72, at 311.
87. See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., Unequal Racial Access to Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 805, 819-20 (1993) (explaining how recipients receive kidneys according to the quality
of the antigen match).
88. Prottas, supra note 85, at 13.
89. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 2, at 45 (reporting that in 2003, Blacks waited
an average of 1,891 days compared to 840 days for Whites).
90. THE ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, CURRENT U.S. WAITING
LIST OVERALL BY ORGAN, at www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp? (select “Waiting List” then
“Organ by State”) (last visited May 11, 2009).
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Donors could be matched to recipients by geographical proximity to one of
the state’s five transplant centers, and scholarships for donors could fund
studies at state-run colleges and universities. Because state legislatures are
elected bodies, it is possible that they would be more sensitive to concerns
about racial equality, and that they might put some pressure on the
inequities created by the current system of allocation.
Another option might be to match donors and recipients by race: if
30,000 Blacks are waiting for kidneys, then 30,000 kidney scholarships
should be made available to Blacks.91 This might address the racism in
current distribution methods. This solution, however, might also run afoul of
recent Supreme Court decisions arguing for race neutral application
processes for high schools and undergraduate institutions.92 The Court has
taken the stance that the only way to prevent discrimination based on race is
to stop discriminating based on race.93 Thus, a program that preferences
Black applicants over other applicants could be found to be a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
One method of avoiding that problem would be by providing
scholarships only for graduate level and professional programs, for example
law and medical degrees. The Supreme Court held that while it was
unconstitutional to use race-based factors to select applicants for an
undergraduate program,94 it was constitutional to use race-based factors to
select entrants in a professional program because maintaining a diverse
student body had an inherent educative value and was “essential to its
educational mission.”95 However, there may not be enough supply of
donors who are qualified to go into law, business, and medicine sufficient to
meet the need for donated kidneys.96

91. This would address the current disparity of need—the neediest population for organs
could be served by the (arguably) neediest population in terms of education. Goodwin,
Altruism’s Limits, supra note 81, at 357; see also NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 3 tbl.A (2004), available at
www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-550.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (noting that Blacks
have a lower percentage than other racial groups of individuals who receive a bachelor’s
degree or more).
92. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(barring race-based regimes for allocating students to high schools); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (finding that a program which favored “underrepresented minority”
applicants solely because of race was not narrowly tailored to achieve an interest in
educational diversity).
93. Seattle Sch., 555 U.S. 701.
94. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270, 275.
95. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329, 343 (2003).
96. A recent article notes that law school applicants dropped to 83,500 from 98,700 in
2006, and medical school applicants from 46,080 in 1997 to 42,000. Alex Williams, The
Falling-Down Professions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2008, at www.nytimes.com/2008/01/
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Perhaps the scholarship incentive program would be best served by
facing the constitutional question head on. A suit over unconstitutional
scholarship distribution could bring concerns about racial inequities in
kidney allocation to the fore, and perhaps lead to changes in the legal
structure for kidney markets. Indeed, if the race-based admission process
for the proposed scholarship program is invalidated as a violation of the
Equal Protection clause, a racially-discriminatory admission process for
kidney waitlists should also be held to violate the Equal Protection clause.97
There are two further risks associated with lining up donors and
recipients along racial lines. First, not every donor or recipient will
automatically self-identify as a member of a particular ethnicity. Individuals
should not be shoehorned into one racial group or another to qualify for
consideration under the scholarship program. In addition, as discussed in
Part II.B, supra, some evidence indicates that Blacks are less likely to
donate, and systems of commodification are less likely to make a positive
net impact in their willingness to donate. If Blacks continue to be
underrepresented in donor populations but overrepresented on waitlists,
then a system matching donor to recipients by race will still result in Black
recipients waiting a disproportionate amount of time to receive a kidney.
One common theme in accounts of lower donation rates among Blacks
is the notion that they distrust the current allocation system.98 Blacks are
more likely to express the belief that persons of color will not get access to
donated kidneys, and thus, that their donations are less likely to have a

06/fashion/06professions.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=the%20falling%20down%20professions&st
=cse (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). For example, in the 2005-2006 academic year, the 195
ABA certified law schools granted only 43,883 juris doctorate degrees. American Bar
Association, JD. and LL.B Degrees Awarded, available at www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/
charts/stats%20-%207.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
97. “Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are
invalidated by it. As we have explained, ‘whenever the government treats any person
unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely
within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.’” Grutter,
539 U.S. at 326-27 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30
(1995)).
98. See GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 2, at 49 (reporting the findings of a study
conducted among African Americans in 2003 which reported high levels of distrust regarding
organ donation); see also HEALY, supra note 62, at 61 (summarizing research that reports
high levels of distrust for the donation process among Blacks, and that OPOs with higher
concentrations of Blacks within their boundaries have measurably lower levels of
procurement); see also Laura A. Siminoff & Christina M. Saunders Sturm, African-American
Reluctance to Donate: Beliefs and Attitudes About Organ Donation and Implications for Policy,
10 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 59, 63 tbl.1 (2000) (reporting that 40.0% of African-American
respondents agree that “[t]he way it’s decided who gets an organ is unfair”, compared with
30.7% of White respondents who agreed).
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positive impact in their own communities. Surveys comparing Black and
White respondents report that Black respondents are more likely to believe
that if a doctor knows a patient is an organ donor, the doctor will not do as
much to save the patient’s life.99 A scholarship system designed to recruit
Black donors with credible assurances of fair allocation could potentially
alter expectations about the procurement system and create a shift in
donating patterns, thus ameliorating some of the concerns noted above.100
The next three Parts of this article identify three specific obstacles to the
scholarship proposal, and argue that in each case the scholarship incentive
fills the gap between the poles of unfettered commodification and exclusive
altruism. Part III responds to concerns about the rhetorical importance of
altruistic language and meaning in the kidney procurement regime. Part IV
identifies the potential coercive and exploitive dangers presented by systems
of commodification, and explains through appeals to heuristics and brain
morphology how the proposed scholarship incentive reduces coercive and
exploitive pressures. Part V identifies the current statutory obstacles to any
incentive system and suggests innovative ways to work within the meaning of
the statute to create room for pilot programs like the proposed scholarship
incentive.
III. SCHOLARSHIP INCENTIVES PRESERVE THE LANGUAGE AND RHETORIC OF
ALTRUISM
In order to rise to Professor Goodwin’s challenge to determine the
appropriate level of commodification,101 it is necessary to deal with the
competing rhetoric of exclusive altruism versus unrestricted commodification
and look for possible common ground between the two.102 As the
anthropologist Donald Joralemon explains, both poles of the debate
operate like the rhetorical equivalent of the anti-rejection drugs.103 Briefly,
in order to keep the transplant recipient’s body from rejecting a new organ,
the recipient must take certain drugs that limit immune responses.

99. Id. (reporting that 37.9% of African-American respondents and 21.2% of White
respondents agree with the following statement: “I worry that if the doctors know that I am an
organ donor, they won’t do as much to save my life.”).
100. Nevin Gewertz & Michele Goodwin, Rethinking Colorblind State Action: A Thought
Experiment on Racial Preferences (manuscript at 28, on file with the author).
es (manuscript at 28, on file with the author).
101. Goodwin, Private Ordering, supra note 6, at 1369, 1384.
102. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Freedoms and Utilities in the Distribution of Health Care, in
MARKETS AND MORALS 149, 163-64 (Gerald Dworkin et al. eds., 1977) (discussing both the
positive and negative outcomes of commodification and altruism in the blood donation
industry).
103. See Donald Joralemon, Organ Wars: The Battle for Body Parts, 9 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 335, 348 (1995).
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Rhetorical structures are designed to make palatable, then acceptable,
finally noble, the somewhat frightening reality of removing an organ from
one human being’s body and placing it within the body of another. Medical
professionals have overwhelmingly chosen to present the procurement of
kidneys for transplantation and its attendant medical realities as a gift,
appealing to the rhetoric of altruism to suppress a potentially negative social
reaction. The language of the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA)
and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)—and their criminal
sanctions—strengthen that commitment to altruistic rhetoric.104 As a
practical matter, it is dangerous to even suggest stepping outside of the
altruistic regime in the process of arranging a kidney transplant.105 Likewise,
the choice of some advocates of incentive programs to couch their
arguments in terms of autonomy instead of market forces or efficiency106
appears to be a conscious choice to shape the debate in a fashion that
makes their position more acceptable to those who might mistrust markets,

104. National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2000) (stating “[a]ny
person who violates [NOTA] . . . shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.”); REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 16(a) (revised 2006)
(stating “a person that for valuable consideration knowingly purchases or sells a part for
transplantation or therapy . . . is subject to a fine . . . or imprisonment); see Michael H.
Shapiro, Regulation as Language: Communicating Values by Altering the Contingencies of
Choice, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 681, 687 (1994) (arguing that if regulatory systems reinforce or
attenuate “certain preferences, attitudes, beliefs and dispositions,” then it is crucial to
recognize that regulation communicates “basic societal ideas.”); see generally JAMES BOYD
WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 203 (1985)
(discussing how criminal law creates a system of rhetoric of meaning which defines the roles
and starting points of the various actors in the system); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE
THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND
COMMUNITY 245 (1984) (arguing that treaties and constitutions set a baseline for the
conversations that we can have about the law and the roles of the various actors within it,
“alter[ing] the rhetorical conditions of life for those in whose name they are promulgated and
those to whom they speak.”).
105. One can witness this effect at matchingdonors.com, a website that provides a forum
for needy potential recipients to solicit willing altruist donors. The website warns, “[i]t is
absolutely against the law to have any financial benefit from organ donation. If you are paid,
or request to be paid, for any transplant you will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.
Violators of this criminal prohibition, can be subject to $50,000 fines and/or five years of
imprisonmement [sic]. Our terms allow us to give all of your personal, contact and tracking
information to the FBI without your permission if you violate this prohibition.”
MatchingDonors.com, Potential Organ Donor Login, at www.matchingdonors.com/life/
Donor/index.cfm?page=login&requested=desktop.cfm?&string=page=main (last visited Apr.
9, 2009).
106. See, e.g., Sally L. Satel & Benjamin E. Hippen, When Altruism Is Not Enough: The
Worsening Organ Shortage and What It Means for the Elderly, 15 ELDER L.J. 153, 198 (2007)
(“Paradoxically, the current system based on altruism-or-else undermines the respect for
individual autonomy that is at the heart of the most widely held values in bioethics.”).
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but embrace concepts of human dignity and liberty. Joralemon, however,
postulates that successfully “suppressing the cultural rejection” of
transplantation might require “some combination of supporting ideologies,
some blend of gift and market rhetoric and policy.”107 His intuition is
The proposed scholarship incentive
echoed by modern scholars.108
possesses just such a potential to preserve a rhetorical middle ground
between the current regime of unrewarded gifting and the oft-advocated
corrective of unrestrained commodification.
Historically, the debate over kidney shortages has taken place at the
poles. Some of the opposition to commodification-oriented solutions stems
from a desire to protect exclusively altruistic donation because it is
understood to perform important rhetorical functions. Indeed, altruism
purists raise several salient concerns about commodification. First and
foremost, altruism purists are concerned that altruism is too fragile to
withstand the encroachment of a market for kidneys.109 Thus, the argument
goes, any commodification runs the risk of triggering a net loss of kidneys
available for transplantation, because donors responding to altruistic urges
will be disgusted by and turn away from donation once market forces take
hold. In addition, altruism purists argue that the sale of organs sends the
wrong message about the sanctity of human life and human bodies.110

107. Joralemon, supra note 103, at 348. Ethicist Suzanne Holland recognizes that “how
we think of things, the conceptual framework that we use, in large measure shapes what we
do with those things.” Suzanne Holland, Contested Commodities at Both Ends of Life: Buying
and Selling Gametes, Embryos, and Body Tissues, 11 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 263, 273
(2001). But Holland views the conceptual framework as fundamentally dichotomous. She
argues that “[i]f we think of the body as a fungible entity, we are more likely to be comfortable
with a market that exchanges it for other fungible entities—e.g., body tissues traded off for
collagen treatments. If, on the other hand, we think of the body as inalienable, we will not
want to subject it to the vicissitudes of the market.” Id. at 274.
108. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and
Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2003) (endeavoring to find a
middle ground between what sociologist Viviana Zelizer calls Radin’s “Hostile Worlds” view of
commodification with Posner’s “Nothing But” advocacy of commodification to advocate for
partially commodified family structures where commodification creates “Differentiated Ties,”
improving connections and increasing affection through commodification, not in spite of it)
(citing Viviana A. Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 817, 818-19,
826 (2000)).
109. See Singer, supra note 102, at 163-64. Singer argues that what is threatened by the
commodification of goods like blood—and by analogy, kidneys—is “the right to give
something that cannot be bought, that has no cash value, and must be given freely if it is to
be obtained at all. This right . . . really is incompatible with the freedom to sell, and we
cannot avoid denying one of these freedoms when we grant the other.” Id.
110. See Carson Holloway, Monetary Incentives for Organ Donation: Practical and Ethical
Concerns, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 152 (Bethany
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They also assert that even if the commodification of body parts itself did not
destroy altruistic giving, it would provide the grounds for a rapid slide down
a slippery slope. There is a fear that ceding any ground to market forces
cedes the battle en toto. Soon, other forms of bodily commodification—
e.g., slavery, baby selling, or doctor assisted suicide with an associated sale
of salvageable organs—would become the norm, and altruistic systems
would become the outlier, more difficult to conceptualize or implement.111
Some will argue that the scholarship incentive program is flawed from
the outset. Critics will undoubtedly find something morally repugnant about
the suggestion that those who might not otherwise be able to afford college
should be required to give up a kidney to access educational opportunities.
I cannot disagree with the core sentiment expressed in that concern. The
scholarship incentive would certainly be undesirable in an ideal world where
everyone who desired might obtain a college degree, regardless of financial
limitations. Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live. As
Margaret Radin recognized, there is value in striving toward ideal justice,
which in the ideal world will “avoid all significant harms to personhood and
community”.112 However, in this world, conditions are not ideal, and we are
often forced to select the best alternative of those available, instead of the
ideal.113 There would be no reason to propose the scholarship incentive to
address the shortage of kidneys if the populace was sufficiently motivated to
engage in unrewarded giving.114 There would also be no reason to worry
that a system of commodification would exploit the poor if there were not
people whose circumstances made the inconvenience and risk of donating a
kidney well worth the compensation they would receive in a hypothetical
unrestricted market. But the proposed scholarship incentive is conceived

Spielman ed., 1996) (explaining the belief that commodification of the human body degrades
the human person).
111. Margaret Radin describes this as the “domino theory” of commodification, which
assumes that “anytime we find market and nonmarket understandings coexisting, . . . it is
inevitable that the market understanding will win out.” MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES 103 (1996). Thus, for subscribers to the domino theory, to entertain any notion
of commodification is to admit defeat and to allow the barbaric rhetoric of the market to storm
the gates. Radin finds the “domino theory” too simplistic, stating that “it concedes too much
to commodification to argue that certain specific items (for example, blood) must remain
completely noncommodified so as to keep open opportunities for altruism[.]” Id. at 107. She
argues instead that “[t]he way to a less commodified society is to see and foster the nonmarket
aspect of much of what we buy and sell, to honor our internally plural understandings, rather
than to erect a wall to keep a certain few things completely off the market and abandon
everything else to market rationality.” Id.
112. Id. at 123.
113. Id.
114. See generally supra Part II.A.
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with an eye toward “society as it is.”115 This article presupposes that it is not
“responsible to allow some to die on the outside chance that someone will
be touched by the spirit of generosity . . . merely to preserve one of many
possible avenues for the expression of [that] generosity.”116 Turning
exclusively to altruism to remedy the shortfall in transplantable organs
cannot be justified on the basis of its effectiveness, because it falls far short
of current and projected need. However, altruism purists have suggested
that such exclusivity is rhetorically necessary to preserve organ donation.
This Part responds to these concerns by arguing that the proposed
scholarship incentive fits within the rhetorical sphere of altruistic giving,
having the potential to preserve the rhetoric of altruism while simultaneously
providing incentives to increase donation.117 The scholarship incentive
aspires to secure a sufficient number of organs in a fashion that is not
hostile to ethical traditions, and which protects individuals from coercion
and exploitation better than a system of outright commodification would.
The scholarship incentive is envisioned as a means of maintaining the
rhetoric of altruism, and protecting the concept of donation as reciprocal
gifting, where donor and recipient both receive and give. The donor gives
of herself physically, and the recipient gets a likely increase of both the
duration and quality of life. The recipient, mostly through the mechanisms
of insurance (private or government) gives the donor an educational benefit
that provides a likely increase to the donor’s quality of life, and perhaps life
expectancy as well.118 In important ways, the kidney donor as scholarship

115. Arthur J. Matas et al., A Proposal for Cadaver Organ Procurement: Routine Removal
with Right of Informed Refusal, 10 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 231, 242 (1985).
116. Id.
117. But see Evans, supra note 33, at 1019-20, 1022 (reporting on a pilot study regarding
incentives for deceased organ donation where respondents balanced a $25,000 voucher for
hospital costs against the mounting debt a hypothetical family faced to keep a family member
on life support, but did not balance a $25,000 cash incentive or a $2,000 voucher for
funeral expenses against the mounting debt). Evans concluded that “a medical bill voucher is
considered to be in the same sphere as the medical bill, and these two variables can therefore
be commensurated. However, equating the surgical removal of organs with an object outside
of the medical sphere—such as the college education the family could buy with the $25,000
hypothetical payment—violates our sense of the sacredness of these institutional boundaries.
Pure commodification of organs—with fungibility outside of the medical sphere—is therefore
not engaged in by the respondents. The more limited commodification from medical
vouchers, where they are used as money internal to the medical sphere, is.” Id. at 1022
(internal citation omitted).
118. One Japanese study found a measurable correlation between educational attainment
and life expectancy. Yoshihisa Fujino et al., A Nationwide Cohort Study of Educational
Background and Major Causes of Death Among the Elderly Population in Japan, 40
PREVENTIVE MED. 444, 446 (2005).
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recipient sustains the rhetoric of gift that is essential to preserving a workable
social conception of kidney procurement.
A.

The Rhetoric of the Gift

Those opposed to increasing organ donation through an open market
are also suspicious of restricted regimes of commodification. While
proponents of such restricted regimes call them “rewarded gifting”,119 others
see rewarded gifting as “a terminological subterfuge meant to [obscure] the
real issue” of kidney donation.120 The anthropologist Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney
suggests that the gift metaphor disguises “a transaction completely devoid of
social relationships,” a market wolf draped in the wool of altruism.121
However, viewing kidney procurement through an exclusively donative lens
is also a terminological subterfuge,122 recognized even by those who are
opposed to market-based solutions.123 Organ donation as gift is entirely
illusory rhetoric, insomuch as it applies to actors in the system other than the
donor herself. The sociologist Kieran Healy speaks of the current model of
kidney donation as a deliberate attempt to preserve the concept of the gift,
even though the reality of kidney donation is that it requires a coordinated
allocation market to make sure the donated kidney gets from the donor to

119. See Daar, supra note 7, at 182.
120. B.N. Colabawalla, Letter to the Editor, High Mortality Among Recipients of Bought
Living-Unrelated Donor Kidneys, 336 LANCET 1194 (1990). Holland echoes that sentiment,
suggesting that overt commodification would be preferable to the current regime of altruistic
donation, where the gift of “[a] donated embryo—or body tissue” generates market profit for
those who use and research donated embryos. Holland, supra note 107, at 280.
121. Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Brain Death and Organ Transplantation: Cultural Bases of
Medical Technology, 35 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 233, 241 (1994). “[D]onated organs—
‘the gift of self,’ literally—are not and cannot be the gift of self because organ donation lacks
the most critical element of gift giving and exchange: social relationship. . . . Without the
social context in which real social agents engage in a transaction, the organ . . . becomes a
candidate for commoditization.” Id.
122. See Joralemon, supra note 103, at 336 (describing the gift rhetoric of organ
procurement as analogous to anti-rejection drugs). Joralemon argues that by packaging
organ donation into gift rhetoric, we inhibit cultural rejection of transplantation and its views of
the body. Id. “What I am arguing is that, at least for the present and near future, the cultural
success of transplantation will be measured by how effectively its supporting ideology
suppresses, rather than replaces, traditional concepts of bodily integrity . . . . This is the
standard by which to judge the likely outcome of the conflict between gift and property rights’
advocates.” Id. at 347.
123. Heléna Ragoné, The Gift of Life: Surrogate Motherhood, Gamete Donation, and
Constructions of Altruism, in TRANSFORMATIVE MOTHERHOOD: ON GIVING AND GETTING IN A
CONSUMER CULTURE 65, 65-66 (Linda L. Layne ed., 1999) (suggesting that gift rhetoric has
been “lavishly applied” to blood and organ donation in “an attempt by participants and by
society to retard, at least symbolically, the trend toward the commodification of life.” (internal
citations omitted)).
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the recipient.124 Recipients of kidneys either pay out of pocket or turn to
private or public insurance to purchase kidneys from procurement agencies,
which generate income by arranging transplants.125 Doctors who perform
transplants are never asked to donate their services because of a concern
that to do otherwise would corrupt the process. Only the donor is treated as
potentially subject to corruption via commodification.126
Nevertheless, transplant service providers are so wedded to gift
language that they are uncomfortable with donors who evidence anything
other than pure altruistic motives. For example, in one highly publicized
case, a hospital in Toronto rejected a donor who was, in their estimation,
“motivated by [a] desire for publicity . . . not by altruism.”127 This rejection
reflects the current perspective of the transplantation community which
accepts living donations from nondirected donors (i.e., donors not related to
or solicited by the recipient) only when their motives are “good” and their
mental health is “balanced.” Nondirected donors who seem overly
interested in media coverage are not only viewed to pose a threat to the
anonymity and privacy of the donor, but also a risk that their decision to
donate might be animated by misguided motives.128

124. See HEALY, supra note 62, at 70 (explaining how organ donation and blood donation
are the best examples of altruistic behavior and both have the symbolic resemblance of an
anonymous gift).
125. Mark Katches et al., Donors Don't Realize They Are Fueling a Lucrative Industry,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 16, 2000, at 1, at www.ocregister.com/features/body/day1.shtml
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (“Companies and tissue banks step around the law by charging
marked-up fees to handle and process the body parts. They avoid billing for the tissue itself.
The law allows for reasonable fees to cover processing costs without defining reasonable.
Tissue banks also avoid using the word ‘sales.’ But Judy Perkins, executive director of the
University of California, San Diego, Regional Tissue Bank, calls fees a euphemism for sales.”).
126. Often, however, those who donate organs or gametes do not realize that they are
contributing to a system rife with commodification. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 107, at
264 (“On hearing of such cases, people often feel ‘cheated,’ duped, conflicted, and even
angry. As one woman said, ‘I thought I was donating to a nonprofit. I didn't know I was
lining someone's pocket. . . . It makes me angry. It makes me appalled. If it's not illegal, it
ought to be. It's certainly immoral.’”) (internal citations omitted).
127. Laura Meckler, For Religious Group, True Charity Begins on Operating Table, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 13, 2007, at A1.
128. See M.A. Dew et al., Guidelines for the Psychosocial Evaluation of Living Unrelated
Kidney Donors in the United States, 7 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1047, 1049 & tbl.2 (2007)
(noting a higher risk for donors whose motives reflect a desire for recognition such as a desire
for publicity or a desire for a personal relationship); Patricia L. Adams et al., The Nondirected
Live-Kidney Donor: Ethical Considerations and Practice Guidelines: A National Conference
Report, 74 TRANSPLANTATION 582, 587 (2002) (reporting at a national conference of the
transplantation community that a nondirected donor “who seems overly interested in media
coverage should not be accepted because of the potential impact of media coverage on the
recipient’s anonymity and privacy.”).
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This tension is manifest even in concerns about an OPO’s own media
communications regarding transplantation.129 OPOs are conflicted about
using the gift of a nondirected donor for PR purposes, even though one
journalist characterized such a PR photo as “a big thing for the hospital, to
have a stranger donate his kidney . . . .”130 For example, Chaya Lipschutz,
a self-appointed kidney matchmaker, draws suspicion from hospitals in part
because “she does offer the promise that ‘if you donate, people will think
the world of you, you’ll feel gratified, it’ll boost your self esteem,’ an
expectation of quid pro quo which might horrify a professional transplant
coordinator. Frankly, some hospitals are wary of Chaya, and won’t deal
with her.”131
One of the key factors OPOs look for in conducting the psychological
screening of nondirected donors is that they have evidenced a commitment
to altruism in other areas of their lives.132 It is interesting to note that this
rhetorical commitment to pure altruism does not fully translate into other
areas where products of the body are at least incompletely commodified:
sperm, eggs, plasma and surrogate motherhood.
When comparing organ donation with the donation of other body
products which are commodified, there is reason to think that the rhetoric of
gift as applied to body parts is merely that: rhetoric. Sperm or egg “donors”
actually sell the products of their body to “recipients” who purchase them (or
who have insurance that purchases them). These “donors” and “recipients”
of gametes frequently invest themselves in a rhetorical structure that allows
them to emphasize the social benefit of the transfer of gametes while
downplaying the financial realities of the transaction.133 As Martha Ertman
has articulated, donors and recipients operate within an open market134—
even the mediator’s title of “sperm bank” clearly belies the rhetoric of gift
129. Id. “[T]he OPO must be cautious in educational brochures that show photos of the
[nondirected donor] and recipient together, implying that such a meeting is commonplace
after the transplant.” Id.
130. This American Life: #347 Matchmakers, 30:09 (Chicago Public Radio broadcast Jan.
18, 2008).
131. Id. at 26:08.
132. See, e.g., L. Wright et al., Living Anonymous Liver Donation: Case Report and Ethical
Justification, 7 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1032, 1033-34 (2007) (“The donor had performed
various conventional acts of altruism such as blood donation and community service, was on
a bone marrow registry and had a signed organ donor card. We viewed these as sufficient
evidence that his primary motive for liver donation was similarly grounded in altruism.”).
133. Ertman, supra note 108, at 17. See Katches et al., supra note 125 (“A typical donor
produces $14,000 to $34,000 in sales for the nonprofits, records and interviews show. But
yields can be far greater. Skin, tendons, heart valves, veins and corneas are listed at about
$110,000. Add bone from the same body, and one cadaver can be worth about
$220,000.”).
134. Ertman, supra note 108, at 15-16.
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which attempts to inoculate society against the jarring dissonance of the
commodification of body parts.135
B.

The Mythical Fragility of Altruism

When dealing with the human body, the commitment to the rhetoric of
altruism is troubling when one realizes the exceptions that are made for
market forces to do their work.136 Nevertheless, there is a strong attachment
to the rhetoric of altruism. Many pure altruists speak of altruism as
something fragile that must be carefully nurtured and protected from
This is not entirely
destruction at the hands of market forces.137
unimaginable. In comparing European countries where a market exists for
plasma with those where plasma may not be sold, there is a measurable
tendency for those in the lowest income quartile not to donate blood when
they can sell plasma instead.138 This may indicate that where the poor have
a commodification option, they are less likely to donate. Even so, that does
not indicate that commodification completely stamps out altruism. Several
studies indicate that the type of individuals who engage in “unrewarded
gifting,” like uncompensated organ donation, are generally unlikely to be
dissuaded from an altruistic course of action simply because others are
rewarded for the same behavior.
1. “True altruists” see things differently
Joralemon points out that those who champion the rhetoric of altruism
connect organ donation to the sorts of acts Americans perform during
disasters and accidents: caring responses to personal tragedies . . . . The
generosity of strangers, the heroism of the person who risks life and limb to

135. Id. at 17 (“The language is likely borrowed from blood donation rhetoric, which refers
to those giving up their blood as donors regardless of whether they receive money. In both
contexts, the terminology masks economic elements of a transaction by suggesting that the
people giving up their body parts are doing so out of altruism rather than economic selfinterest.”).
136. See Katches et al., supra note 125 (discussing specific entities that make huge profits
from selling products of donated human bodies).
137. See, e.g., Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending the Generous Heart: Mandatory Pro Bono
and Moral Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 468 (2001) (arguing that altruistic
impulses, if they exist, are more fragile than egoist impulses, and thus that “any dampening
influences on altruistic inclinations are significant.”); C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM
QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 125-26 (1991) (“[A]ltruistic motivation
that blossoms from feeling empathy may be a fragile flower, easily crushed by overriding
egoistic concerns.”).
138. HEALY, supra note 62, at 84.
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rescue those he or she does not know, the coming together of
neighborhoods in mutual support at moments of natural destruction . . . .139

The philosopher and political scientist Kristen Renwick Monroe made a
similar finding in her efforts to define altruistic behavior.
Monroe
interviewed Europeans who took great risks to save Jews during World War
II in an attempt to determine what drives “true altruism.” Monroe
distinguishes true altruists, those who engage in “behavior intended to
benefit another, even when [it] risks possible sacrifice to the welfare of the
actor”140 from those who engage in “quasi-altruistic behavior”—acts which
benefit another, but perhaps with benefit to the actor in mind.141 Monroe
reached the conclusion that those who engage in true altruism are
motivated by a perspective about their fellow human beings and about the
world that is measurably different from those who do not engage in altruistic
behavior.142 Monroe describes a perspective of a shared humanity that
motivates altruists to take risks on behalf of those they perceive to be in
need without taking the risk to self fully into account.143
Several studies lend credence to this concept. The 2005 Gallup poll
indicates that those who would consider making a living donation to a
stranger under the current regime of exclusive altruism are the exception,
rather than the rule.144 This understanding of altruistic giving coincides with
139. Joralemon, supra note 103, at 344.
140. KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, THE HEART OF ALTRUISM: PERCEPTIONS OF A COMMON
HUMANITY 6 (1996).
141. Id. at 7. Monroe's definition of altruism excludes giving that benefits another where
“another's welfare is treated as an unintended or secondary consequence of behavior
designed primarily to further [the giver's] own welfare.” Id. at 6. This definition would relegate
donation done through the scholarship incentive program to quasi-altruistic status.
142. Id. at 204. Quasi-altruism, as Monroe defines it, matches less restrictive definitions of
altruism as posited by other authors. For example, Arthur C. Brooks defines charity as “an
expression of ‘affection’” which has “the ability to transform the giver and receiver in unique
and important ways.” ARTHUR C. BROOKS, WHO REALLY CARES: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT
COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM 6-7 (2006). The only restrictions Brooks places on his
definition are that charity must be both consensual for and beneficial to both donor and
recipient. Id. at 6. A third definition of altruism, as applied specifically to organ donation
under the current regime, posits that “[d]onation, though perhaps multi-motivational, is
conceptually altruistic since no one may be compelled to donate an organ or tissue, either
during life or after death.” Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an
Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1343 (2000).
143. MONROE, supra note 140, at 207. On the other hand, Charles Daniel Batson has
conducted research that suggests that altruism decreases as the cost of engaging in altruistic
behavior increases. BATSON, supra note 137, at 89. If that is the case, then any system of
commodification might increase altruism, if an offered incentive presents enticement sufficient
to cause the giver to discount the potential risks involved in engaging in altruistic behavior.
144. See GALLUP 2005, supra note 37, at 19 tbl.5 (reporting that while 61.7% of
respondents identified themselves as very likely to make a living donation to a family member,
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a recent study led by Dr. L. Ebony Boulware, which found that those who
volunteer to donate a kidney, either for a family member or to a stranger,
show an increased willingness to take risks typically associated with kidney
donation.145 As a first cut, the Boulware study seems to corroborate the
notion that those who engage in pure altruism or unrewarded gifting—the
means of kidney procurement favored rhetorically by law and the
transplantation community—see the world differently than the majority of the
population. While the Boulware study does not articulate Monroe’s
description of a “shared humanity perspective,” it does corroborate her
findings regarding a willingness to accept risk to help others. Other studies
indicate that the vast majority of kidney donors engage in “‘moral,’
nondeliberative, instantaneous decision-making” rather than “rational
decision-making [which] includes multiple steps that focus on gathering
relevant information, evaluating alternatives, selecting an alternative, and
implementing the decision.”146 In one study, seventy-eight percent of
donors indicated that they “knew right away that they would donate.”147 In
another study of liver lobe donors, the donors themselves specifically
commented on the fact that they did not stop to consider and weigh the
elements of their decision.148 Finally, an in-depth psychological evaluation
of respondents who self-identified as willing to make a living donation of a
kidney to a stranger found a statistically significant difference between the
way that participants judged to be truly committed to living donation to a
stranger evaluated the “External Costs” associated with kidney donation,
and the way that participants judged to be uncommitted weighed those
costs.149 Without overstating the conclusion, these data points suggest that

and 31.3% expressed a willingness to donate to a close friend, only 8.1% of respondents
stated they were very likely to make a living donation to someone they do not know).
145. L. Ebony Boulware et al., Attitudes, Psychology, and Risk Taking of Potential Live
Kidney Donors: Strangers, Relatives, and the General Public, 5 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1671,
1671-72, 1676 (2005) (finding no correlation between psychological illness, depression, or
religious affiliation and willingness to donate kidneys, but finding increased willingness to take
risks associated with kidney donation among nondirected donors who contacted hospitals and
were willing to donate a kidney).
146. Mary Amanda Dew et al., Psychosocial Aspects of Living Organ Donation, in LIVING
DONOR TRANSPLANTATION 7, 11 (Henkie P. Tan et al. eds., 2007).
147. Id. (citing ROBERTA G. SIMMONS, SUSAN D. KLEIN & RICHARD L. SIMMONS, GIFT OF LIFE:
THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 242 tbl.8.1 (1977)).
148. Megan Crowley-Matoka et al., Long-Term Quality of Life Issues Among Adult-toPediatric Living Liver Donors: A Qualitative Exploration, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 744, 745
(2004) (reporting that donors made statements such as “‘I think I was on automatic pilot . . . It
happened, it happened fast and we did it.’”). This is so, even though liver lobe donation
could present a higher risk of harm or impairment than kidney donation. Id. at 748.
149. Monica A. Landolt et al., They Talk the Talk: Surveying Attitudes and Judging Behavior
About Living Anonymous Kidney Donation, 76 TRANSPLANTATION 1437, 1439-40 & tbl.3
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those individuals who are willing to engage in unrewarded gifting see the
world in a way that is markedly different than the majority of the population.
If that intuition is correct, it may also be true that to provide kidneys
sufficient to meet transplantation needs, it will be necessary to motivate a
different type of potential donor in a different fashion than the one used by
the current exclusively altruistic allocation regime. If, on the other hand, it is
possible to change perceptions and encourage more people to become true
altruists by clinging to the rhetoric of gift, then this may be sufficient reason
to prevent commodification.150 However, attempting to change at least if
what Radin identifies as the domino theory of commodification151 (effectively
a slippery slope rationale) holds—even partial commodification may move
us farther away from a world where we develop an altruistic perspective in
the population at large. However, attempting to change the way the
general population sees the world might prove a task too drastic for the
rhetorical force of altruism.
2. Rewarded gifting need not destroy altruistic giving
If true altruists are individuals who give because of how they see the
world, as opposed to rational actors who give because they see something
in it for them, perhaps commodification systems designed to reach rational
actors will also fail to dissuade true altruists from donating. Monroe’s
interviewees discussed their feelings about Gestapo agents who helped Jews
late in the war as insurance against the coming Nazi defeat.152 This
behavior is quasi-altruism, as Monroe defines it, done for the benefit of the
Gestapo agents and not for those they helped. For the interviewees, the
universal response was that it was not important to them “that the motives of
the helper be pure. . . . [t]he more important thing was that people were
saved, not that they were saved for the right reasons.”153 This suggests that,
even though those who give with impure motives benefit from their quasialtruistic giving, the pure altruist remains willing to give so long as people

(2003) (reporting on an in depth interview of fifty-two participants who identified themselves as
willing to make a living donation to a stranger in a previous exam, and measuring a statistical
significant variation in table 3 (P>0.0001) in the way committed and uncommitted
participants weighed. “[T]he external costs imposed on the donor, such as financial costs,
extensive medical tests, fears associated with undergoing major surgery, potential health
problems, the experience of pain, and the fear that it all might be for naught if the transplant
is not successful.” Id. at 1439).
150. If the domino theory of commodification holds true, see RADIN, supra note 111 at
103, then even partial commodification may move us farther away from a world where the
population at large develops an altruistic perspective.
151. See RADIN, supra note 111, at 103.
152. MONROE, supra note 140, at 146.
153. Id.
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receive the help they need, and regardless of whether the pure altruist
herself stands to benefit. For the pure altruist, Monroe finds that altruistic
behavior is both ingrained and somewhat subconscious.154 If the risk of
death for themselves and their families did not dissuade true altruists from
saving the lives of Jews in occupied Europe, why would an incentive like the
scholarship proposal dissuade those already willing to donate kidneys to a
fatally ill recipient?
The Gallup Poll and the Bryce study discussed earlier suggest that while
those who are unlikely to donate reported some negative reaction to
commodification systems, those who were already predisposed to donate
reported that commodification systems made them more likely to donate,
In an earlier 1993 Gallup Poll, non-Caucasian
not less likely.155
respondents who identified themselves as opposed to deceased donation of
their organs became more opposed when asked about the possibility that
their family would receive financial incentives for their organs at death.156
For respondents contemplating deceased donation, this may stem in part
from a concern that their families will be convinced to “pull the plug” on
life-preserving technologies to early at the behest of the attending
physician.157
The Bryce study suggests that partial commodification regimes are more
acceptable to the public than unrestrained commodification. For example,
funeral benefits, hospital expenses and travel reimbursement for family
members of deceased donors, all types of rewarded gifting,158 received a
strong positive response, while charitable cash donations in the donor’s
name were received less favorably, and direct payment for organs, i.e.,
unrestricted commodification, was the least favored option.159 Like the other
types of rewarded gifting, scholarships and financial aid occupy an
154. Id. at 148-49 (noting that the interviews detected “a consistent pattern of [altruistic]
behavior, that there is indeed such a thing as the ‘altruistic personality,’ in which the habit of
helping others has become so ingrained over the years that the helping response is virtually
automatic.”).
155. Bryce et al., supra note 47, at 3002 (reporting that for respondents who identified
themselves as registered donors, every benefit program with the exception of direct payment
increased the likelihood that the registered donors would register again); GALLUP 2005, supra
note 37, at 24 fig.12 (“Financial Incentives and Deceased Organ Donation 1993-2005”).
156. GALLUP 1993, supra note 36, at 43 tbl.32, 44.
157. GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS, supra note 2, at 50 (citing a survey respondent who
indicated that “‘a lot of people feel that your organs will be harvested before you actually
die.’”).
158. See generally Daar, supra note 7, at 187 (noting that reward gifting includes
compensation for loss of wages, hospitalization and other related expenses).
159. Bryce et al., supra note 47, at 3001 (noting that this disparity did not amount to a
negative reaction by respondents, even to outright commodification which was supported by
fifty-three percent of respondents).
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important rhetorical space between outright commodification and altruistic
gift, which suggests that the proposed scholarship incentive would be more
palatable to donors and the public, and less likely to trigger an adverse
social reaction than an unrestricted cash award.
C. The Rhetorical Power of Scholarship Incentives
Academic scholarships are spoken of in the language of gift.
Solicitations for donations from university alumni are typically couched as an
invitation to contribute a gift to the alma mater.160 Those pleas rarely
acknowledge the market exchange qualities of charitable solicitation,161
even though the donation of a financial gift to a qualified university can
provide the donor with significant tax and reputation benefits. For donors
who contribute large status-enhancing gifts, the power of the gift to signal
the status of the giver is tied directly to its gift rhetoric—because scholarships
and endowments are spoken of as gifts, couched in the rhetoric of altruism,
they allow the status-seeker to be seen as someone who actually is
charitable, instead of merely someone seeking to call attention to her
considerable wealth.162 To speak of these donations in market language
destroys that perception. The behavior of donors making status-enhancing
contributions, including the endowment of scholarships, suggests that these
scholarships evidence the rhetorical power of gift.
Instructions for a recent survey distributed by the California State
University Office of the Chancellor to various departments to measure
contributions from donors took pains to distinguish between voluntary giving
(which the instructions refer to as “Voluntary Support of Education”)163 and

160. See, e.g., Daniel Mark Fogel & James Pizzagalli, Scholarship: The Gift of a Lifetime—
A Message from President Daniel M. Fogel and Chairman of the Board James Pizzagalli (Nov.
1, 2004), at www.uvm.edu/~campaign/media/gallery_news_cu.php?return_URL=%2F%7
Ecampaign%2Fnewsevents.php&SID=&G_ID=news&GI_ID=85YMywY4icLoe1v&GI_I=43
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (stating that “[a] gift to scholarships at UVM is truly the gift of a
lifetime.”).
161. For example, a recent publication from the University of Chicago Law School
mentioned the words gift, giving, or its synonyms like endow and provide, forty-nine times,
and the financial, tax, or reputational benefits to the donor twenty-five times. THE UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, ELEMENTS OF THE CENTENNIAL CAPITAL CAMPAIGN FOR EXCELLENCE
(2004).
162. David Gamage & Allon Kedem, Commodification and Contract Formation: Placing
the Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299, 1332 (2006).
163. CAL. STATE UNIV. OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR, ADVANCEMENT REPORTING AND DATA
COLLECTION PROCESS 5 (2008), available at www.calstate.edu/universityadvancement/
intranet/policies-procedures/documents/advancement_data_instructions.pdf (last visited Apr.
9, 2009) (“What is a Gift? A contribution received by an institution for either unrestricted or
restricted use in the furtherance of the institution for which it has made no commitment of
resources or services other than, possibly, committing to use the gift as the donor specifies.
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quid pro quo exchanges.164 While the instructions are careful to ensure that
there is no quid pro quo for donors, it is equally clear that the California
State University system goes to some lengths to recognize many of its
donors.165
As an examination of a recent philanthropic solicitation from the
University of Chicago Law School suggests, the rhetoric used to solicit
philanthropic giving to an educational institution is multifaceted,
simultaneously appealing to a sense of duty to recompense the institution for
what one was given; a sense of belonging for those who elect to contribute;
a sense of quid pro quo—that the donations made to the university are an
investment which will provide some sort of psychic, if not financial return;
and lastly, a sense of obligation based on the need of the institution. There
is surprisingly little discussion of possible tax benefits to the giver, especially
considering the reputation of the University of Chicago as a champion of
law and economics166 and the rational actor model.167

The contribution is a nonreciprocal transfer in that there is no implicit or explicit statement of
exchange, purchase of services, or provision of exclusive information. If the donor receives
benefits in return for the contribution, the amount of the gift recorded and reported is reduced
by the fair market value of all benefits given, according to U.S. Internal Revenue Service
regulations. The institution has no obligation to report to the donor how the gift is used or
invested; but institutions are not prevented from providing such reports as part of donor
stewardship.”).
164. Id. Characteristics of exchange (quid pro quo) transactions to be excluded from the
VSE survey:
 The funding entity initiates the project, participates actively in determining how funds will
be spent, and defines performance objectives.
 Proprietary results belong to the funding entity, in whole or in part, after the work is
completed.
 Funds provide goods or services for the funding entity.
 Results of the work have a specific commercial value for the funding entity that equal or
exceed the amount of the grant.
 The funding entity retains intellectual property rights (i.e. copyrights or exclusive
knowledge of outcomes).
 The university gives up the benefits of the research to the funding entity.
Id. at 5-6.
165. See, e.g., San Diego State University: Contribution Highlights, available at
www.calstate.edu/universityadvancement/reports/0405externalreport/campus/san_diego.pdf
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (“The San Diego State Entrepreneurial Management Center received
a $1 million pledge from the Lavin Family Foundation for unrestricted current use support.
The gift will be used to build programming, support research and assist students pursuing their
entrepreneurial studies.”).
166. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Richard Posner Meets Reb Chaim of Brisk: A Comparative
Study in the Founding of Intellectual Legal Movements, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 95, 108 (2006)
(noting “the significance of law and economics as a late twentieth century movement, and of
the importance of Posner and the Chicago school as leading proponents . . . .”).
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The law also conceives of scholarships as something other than market
transactions, even when many, if not all, scholarships are founded on an
implicit, if not explicit, bargained-for exchange. The Internal Revenue Code
generally treats academic scholarships as non-taxable income,168 but where
there is a quid pro quo involved—for example, “any amount received which
represents payment for teaching, research, or other services by the student
required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship”169—
scholarships are to be treated as valuable consideration and taxed as
income.170
The tax liability articulated in the Internal Revenue Code is not
necessarily an operational reality at the university level. For example, most
scholarships are not taxed, even though the majority of them include
preconditions to qualify for academic scholarships, and conditions attached
to the continuation of such a scholarship, including maintaining a certain
grade point average171 and not engaging in illegal activity.172 In essence,
where academic scholarships are involved, the Internal Revenue Service
turns a blind eye to many bargained-for exchanges.
Athletic scholarships are also treated differently than market
transactions,173 even though the quid pro quo of the athletic scholarship is a

167. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1706 (1986)
(acknowledging that the practitioners of the Chicago school method of law and economics
“apply a neoclassical model that assumes rational actors and an inevitable drive toward
production at marginal cost.”).
168. Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 117(a) (2008).
169. I.R.C. § 117(c)(1) (2008).
170. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 92 (14th ed. 2006).
171. For example, students in Georgia who receive the HOPE Scholarship, which provides
free tuition at Georgia colleges and universities, continue to qualify for the Scholarship so
long as they maintain a 3.0 grade point average throughout their postsecondary studies.
GACollege41, Maintaining Eligibility for the HOPE Scholarship, at www.gacollege411.org/
FinAid/ScholarshipsAndGrants/HOPEScholarship/maintaining.asp#a2 (last visited Apr. 9,
2009).
172. See, e.g., NORTHWEST COLLEGE, NJCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE CODE OF CONDUCT (2007),
available at www.northwestcollege.edu/athletics/docs/coc_njcaa.pdf (last visited Apr. 9,
2009) (noting that student-athletes will be suspended or dismissed from school for any arrest
other than a minor traffic offense). Note, however, that negative requirements are not
necessarily viewed as a quid pro quo, according to some commentators of contract law.
Compare Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 366-67 (Neb. 1898) (recognizing the lack of
consideration in a promise from grandfather to granddaughter to support her financially
should she restrain from working, but enforcing the promise on the grounds of promissory
estoppel) with Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (holding that refraining from the
use of liquor or tobacco is sufficient consideration for a promise to pay a sum of money at a
later date).
173. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47 (stating that athletic scholarships are not taxable
income because “the university requires no particular activity of any of its scholarship
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well-documented reality.174 This determination by the IRS ignores the reality
that athletes who are not productive (or whose style of play does not suit the
needs of a new coach) can find themselves cut from a university’s athletic
program without any legal recourse.175 While athletic scholarships are
treated as valuable consideration in contract disputes between student
athletes and universities,176 the IRS simultaneously engages in the legal
fiction that athletes are not “required [to compete] as a condition for
receiving the qualified scholarship.”177 It is unclear why the IRS does not tax
athletic scholarships despite their nature of providing a bargained-for
exchange. What is clear is that there is some incongruity between the tax
treatment of these scholarships and their treatment in the course of contract
disputes. Both academic and athletic scholarships178 occupy a unique
rhetorical middle ground between unrestricted commodification and
altruistic giving.
Providing financial incentives in the form of a scholarship occupies a
different rhetorical space than that of a raw financial incentive. An incentive
program that naturally leads to a discussion of financial incentives in terms
of gift language preserves the rhetoric of altruism and protects space for
altruistic meaning.

recipients. Although students who receive athletic scholarships do so because of their special
abilities in a particular sport and are expected to participate in the sport, the scholarship is not
cancelled in the event the student cannot participate and the student is not required to engage
in any other activities in lieu of participating in the sport.”).
174. Sean M. Hanlon, Comment, Athletic Scholarships as Unconscionable Contracts of
Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 41, 43-45 (2006) (describing the
misperception that student-athletes are protected for all four years of scholarship eligibility,
and the reality that NCAA rules permit universities to deny renewal of an athlete’s scholarship
without cause if reasonable notice is provided).
175. See, e.g., Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that where a student-athlete did not participate in sports when he was both
academically and physically able to do so, the school was justified in canceling his
scholarship), cert. denied, 192 S.E.2d 197 (N.C. 1972).
176. The following courts have acknowledged the contractual nature of the relationship
between universities and scholarship athletes: Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416-17
(7th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991); Barile
v. Univ. of Va., 441 N.E.2d 608, 615 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981); Colo. Seminary (Univ. of
Denver) v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885, 895 (D. Colo. 1976); Begley v. Corp. of Mercer Univ.,
367 F. Supp. 908, 909-10 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 38. Contra Rensing v.
Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1174-75 (Ind. 1983) (holding the relationship
between student athletes and the university is not contractual).
177. I.R.C. § 117(c)(1) (2008).
178. See infra Part V.
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IV. SCHOLARSHIP INCENTIVES REDUCE COERCIVE PRESSURE AND EXPLOITATIVE
EFFECTS
The previous Part of this article provides the rhetorical justification for
the scholarship incentive, and suggests that it might be an acceptable
means of encouraging donation without triggering hostile reactions from the
public. However, public acceptance of the scholarship incentive does not
resolve questions of coercion and exploitation. Critics of commodification
regimes frequently argue that paying donors to part with their kidney will
exploit the donor’s poverty or lack of economic or employment opportunities
and create coercive pressure that the donor cannot resist. These coercive
effects would impair the decisional capacity of donors to correctly weigh the
costs and benefits of kidney donation. Implicit in that argument is the notion
that the money offered in exchange for a kidney would not adequately
compensate the donor for taking the risk involved. Market transfers may
provide net harm to those donors that weigh financial considerations more
heavily than concerns about long term health and well-being. However,
even if unfettered cash compensation for kidneys would impair the
decisional capacity of potential donors, the structure of the proposed
scholarship incentive dissipates that coercive pressure.
The scholarship incentive is most likely to attract “emerging adults,” a
population of potential donors aged eighteen to twenty-five,179 often viewed
as vulnerable to coercion.180 By examining literature on availability
heuristics, brain morphology, and analogous existing legal structures, this
Part argues that emerging adult populations have sufficient decisional

179. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late
Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 470-71 (2000).
180. One might wonder whether the scholarship program would unduly benefit male
scholar-donors, who need not be concerned about the health effects of donation on a
subsequent pregnancy, but the medical literature finds no significant correlation between living
kidney donation and complications with subsequent pregnancy. See Lucile E. Wrenshall et al.,
Pregnancy After Donor Nephrectomy, 62 TRANSPLANTATION 1934 (1996) (reporting on fortyfive gestations and/or pregnancies among thirty-three living kidney donors and observing that
donor nephrectomy did not introduce complications in excess of those experienced by the
general population); J.W. Jones et al., Pregnancy Following Kidney Donation, 25
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3082 (1993) (reporting that fourteen female living kidney donors
subsequently had twenty-three successful full-term pregnancies, and that for eight women who
experienced full-term pregnancy both pre-and post-donation, “there were no differences in the
complications or results of [the] pregnancies before and after kidney donation . . . .”). See
also M.M. Shekhtman & S.B. Petrova, 72 TERAPEVTICHESKĬ ARKHIV 39 (2000) (concluding that a
“[s]olitary kidney is not contraindication to pregnancy,” but that “[o]bstetric complications
arose more frequently than in women with two kidneys”) (Russian article, abstract available in
English, available at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10900647?ordinalpos=2&itool=Entrez
System2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum (last visited Apr. 9,
2009)).
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capacity to correctly weigh the costs and benefits of donating a kidney, even
in view of the substantial reward of an educational scholarship, because of
the nature of the benefit provided by an educational scholarship. This Part
first establishes some terms of the debate, explaining why cash rewards
might have a coercive influence that overwhelms the decisional capacity of
underprivileged populations. The Part next explains the coercive effects
already built into the current kidney allocation regime. This Part concludes
by describing how the scholarship incentive can protect the capacity of
donors to make an informed, voluntary decision to donate.
A.

Unfair Transactions and Background Inequities

Risk, as defined by Corinna Alberg and collaborators, is “[t]he possibility
of beneficial and harmful outcomes and the likelihood of their occurrence in
a stated timescale.”181 Risk assessment is thus the process of determining
the likelihood that harms and benefits will occur when engaging in a
particular course of action. Mike Titterton, who studies health care and
social work, defines risk taking as “a course of purposeful action based on
informed decisions concerning the possibility of positive and negative
outcomes of types and levels of risk appropriate in certain situations.”182 By
these definitions, the key to assuring that risks are correctly assessed is
making sure that the individual assessing the risk has all necessary
information to make a correct decision.
In the field of organ donation, medical ethics requires that a donor has
the competence to give informed consent before the donation can move
forward. Medical ethics requires competence not in the abstract, but
competence to decide to undertake a particular medical risk, called
“decisional capacity.”183 For the purposes of this article, decisional capacity
is the competence to recognize the risks and benefits involved with donating
a kidney, and to make an informed choice whether or not to do so. Some
argue that the decisional capacity required to give informed consent to
donation is compromised by the introduction of financial incentives.184 The
standard argument against commodification is that markets for kidneys will
have a coercive effect, strong enough to impair the decisional capacity of
donors. Implicit in that argument is an associated notion that the money
offered in exchange for a kidney would not fully compensate the donor for

181. CORINNA ALBERG ET AL., LEARNING MATERIALS ON MENTAL HEALTH: RISK ASSESSMENT 9
(1996).
182. MIKE TITTERTON, RISK AND RISK TAKING IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE 25 (2005).
183. JUDITH C. AHRONHEIM ET AL., ETHICS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 29 (2d ed. 2000).
184. The ethicist Alan Wertheimer recounts that one bioethicist likens “‘dangling thousands
of dollars in front of a poor person . . . [to] putting a gun to someone’s head and telling them
to do something.’” ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 68 (1987).
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taking the risk involved, or that it would compel a potential donor to take a
risk greater than she otherwise would undertake for a commensurate
reward.
There are ways in which financial incentives can compromise decisional
capacity to donate. First, the introduction of money may cause prospective
donors to engage in faulty risk assessment. Two different psychological
phenomena, hyperbolic discounting and availability heuristics, help explain
this possibility. Hyperbolic discounting is a behavioral economics finding
that people prefer smaller, immediate payoffs to larger, long-term payoffs.
When asked to balance cash in hand against temporally distant future
benefit or risk—such as health complications which can follow kidney
donation—individuals typically discount the value of later benefit or risk
because it is removed in time.185 However, when measuring two distinct
future values, test subjects tend to pick the larger of the two values, even
when it is removed farther in time than the first value. Addicts186 tend to
demonstrate a high occurrence of hyperbolic discounting, often steeply
discounting the long-term consequences of a currently desired behavior.
The availability heuristic is a rule of thumb for decision making, where
an outcome seems more likely when it is more easily brought to mind, i.e.,
more available.187 A cash payment could exert a distorting effect on
decisional capacity, because an immediate cash compensation is simply
more “available”—i.e., more easily brought to mind—than the risks
presented by donating a kidney, unless the donor is familiar with
experiences that other donors have had. The value of money is more
readily available in making the risk assessment than the noneconomic,
psychic benefits associated with altruistic giving. Thus, weighing the longterm benefits of the health of the recipient against the potential long-term
risks to the health of the donor will lead to one type of risk calculation, while
weighing a future health risk against cold hard cash will tend to lead to an
entirely different evaluation.

185. Andres Raineri & Howard Rachlin, The Effect of Temporal Constraints on the Value of
Money and Other Commodities, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 77, 80 (1993) (measuring
the effect where test subjects were asked to value lottery winnings at a particular period in the
future against a smaller, immediate amount in the present).
186. See, e.g., Andrew Green, Self Control, Individual Choice, and Climate Change, 26
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 92-93 (2008) (“Given hyperbolic discounting, delayed penalties or rewards
may be ineffective to deal with addiction. Individuals discount the delayed and uncertain
reward or penalty more than the immediate gratification from the choice, so immediate
rewards or penalties are likely more effective.”).
187. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973) (“A person is said to employ the
availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which
instances or associations could be brought to mind.”).
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A second and related way in which cash compensation could
compromise decisional capacity is by taking advantage of the unfortunate
background circumstances of the donor. While cash may be more salient
than psychic benefits to any single individual, it is likely to be much more
salient to an individual who comes from a background of poverty than one
who comes from a background of wealth.188 This understanding is not
unlike the Biblical story of Esau, willing to sell his birthright to his brother
Jacob for a mess of pottage to satisfy his immediate hunger. In heuristic
terms, the “mess of pottage” Esau craved was far more salient than the
birthright, which Esau “despised,” or undervalued, in part because of its
temporal remoteness.189 A more modern example is the willingness of
lottery winners to exchange their future winnings for a cash sum, even when
doing so reduces the total amount of money the winner receives.190

188. Interestingly, the presumption that the scholarship incentive will exert undue coercive
pressure due to the disadvantaged backgrounds of students might not be universally true.
Several Ivy League schools have recently provided grants for, or waived tuition for, students
whose families make less than $100,000 per year. See Brown Ends Tuition for Lower-Income
Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2008, at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=94
02E6DE103AF936A15751C0A96E9C8B63&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (last visited Apr. 9,
2009) (reporting that Brown, Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, and Stanford have all replaced loans
for lower income students with grants); Larry Gordon, Stanford Offers Middle-Class Tuition
Break, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/21/local/mecollegeaid21 (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (reporting that Stanford will eliminate tuition for
students whose families make less than $100,000 per year). If, as currently conceived, the
scholarship incentive pays the costs of attending any university to which the donor can get
admitted, then students in poverty who qualify for schools like Brown and Stanford will get no
benefit from the incentive: it is the well-heeled student who would stand to save the tuition
(currently $36,000 per year at Stanford) by taking advantage of the scholarship incentive.
However, those programs do not carry very far down the line at academic institutions, because
few schools have endowments that schools like Princeton and Harvard have amassed. Karen
W. Arenson, Soaring Endowments Widen a Higher Education Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008,
at A14 (reporting that Princeton, for example, boasts a $15.8 billion endowment, while
Harvard’s endowment grew by $5.7 billion last year). So the top Ivy League schools might
change the tax bracket of potential donors most attracted to the scholarship incentive.
189. Genesis 25:29-34.
190. In Massachusetts, for example, several lottery winners sold off their payments to a
company for a lump sum, usually giving up between seven and twenty percent of their future
income stream. See Bruce Mohl, Hey, Lottery Winner, Want a Lump Sum? Let the Game
Begin, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 2005, at E11. California’s first lump sum lottery payment
paid roughly fifty cents on the dollar. Jamie Beckett, Lotto Prize Brokers Hit Jackpot:
Companies Buy and Resell Annual Payments from Winners, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 11,
1998, at D2.
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Studies from India191 and Iran192 indicate that vendors who sold a kidney
to get out of debt experienced a net reduction in both health and welfare
after the sale. It seems clear from these studies that a desire to meet shortterm financial difficulties creates pressure to engage in any number of
potentially lucrative activities, and that desperate financial straits may impair
decisional capacity.
However, the Iranian study also noted “an
extraordinary lack of information about preservation of the remaining
kidney” and a marked unwillingness or perceived inability to receive postoperative care.193 Lack of education put vendors in a situation where they
could do little other than physical labor.194 Few had insurance, and many
lost work during the post-operative period.195 Finally, the Iranian vendors
suffered a significant amount of both internal and external psychological
stigma related to their decision to sell a kidney. For example, many vendors
reported that in arguments on unrelated matters, the opponent would refer
to the vendor with the invective, “‘you kidney seller,’” to which the vendor
had no retort, resulting in the vendor’s shame and embarrassment.196 These
data points indicate that there is a real social weight and rhetorical power
found in the difference between the donation and sale of kidneys. In Iran, it
is often a family member to whom the vendor owes money who puts
pressure on the donor to sell the kidney.197 Finally, vendors were
preoccupied with the loss of their kidney in part because they knew if they
lost the second kidney, they could not afford to purchase one on the open
market.198
These studies suggest several important safeguards that must be built
into the scholarship program. First, the scholarship program must not
circumvent a careful psychological assessment of potential donors, and of
the family support structure in place for post-operative care. Second,
191. Goyal, supra note 28, at 1591-92.
192. Javaad Zargooshi, Quality of Life of Iranian Kidney “Donors,” 166 J. UROLOGY 1790,
1790-91 (2001) (reporting that in interviews with 307 Iranian kidney vendors, significant
portions of the population reported dissatisfaction with their choice to sell a kidney, concerns
about their physical health and ability to work, and showed high incidence of depression).
Interestingly, the entire reported donor population had no more than a high school education,
and a significant number (thirty-five percent) were identified as illiterate. Id. at 1791, tbl.1. It
is hard to dispute that in the case of the Iranian vendors, severe poverty drove them to a
decision they thought was necessary at the time, and the minority of vendors who reported
willingness to vend again stated they would do so “because there was absolutely no other way
to provide short-term support for their urgent financial need.” Id. at 1796.
193. Id. at 1791.
194. Id. at 1795.
195. Id. at 1794.
196. Id.
197. Zargooshi, supra note 192, at 1795.
198. Id. at 1796.
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reasonable post-operative care must be provided to donors, regardless of
income, insurance, or other factors. Third, it is crucial that donors applying
for the scholarship program are provided with sufficient information to make
an informed consent, specifically about long term health risks for the loss of
the second kidney. Fourth, all donors (both altruistic and scholarship)
should be awarded priority for obtaining a kidney in the case of a future
accident or disease. Finally, there must be a mechanism which provides
equally for rich and poor potential recipients to be able to obtain a kidney.
The method of distributing kidneys cannot depend on the ability of the
recipient to pay. The perception that poverty cuts vendors off from kidneys if
they should face a future need seems to add to the emotional and
psychological harms that vendors suffer.199
B.

Coercive Effects of the Current Regime

Any system of commodification could exploit the background
circumstances faced by potential donors.200 On one level, the scholarship
incentive is no different. Those who are financially well off, or who can
afford the best education available, will not be attracted to the proposed
scholarship incentive. Open market advocates argue that preventing
underprivileged parties from selling that which they possess hurts them far
worse than any potential unfairness that background circumstances
introduce into the underlying bargain.201 In addition, the current regime of
exclusive altruism also exploits vulnerable groups based on background
situations outside the control of the transplantation industry. The following
examples are illustrative.
First, the current shortage of kidneys available for transplantation creates
background pressure which drive wealthy potential recipients to third world
countries where there is little in the way of regulation, information, or
aftercare provided for kidney vendors.202 In some of those countries,

199. Id.
200. ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 27 (1996) (discussing how, for example, “poor
background circumstances” might be understood to “‘force’” a recruit to join the military
because there is no better option).
201. Id. at 111 (noting that even if background conditions compromise the voluntariness of
a person’s choice in accepting an offer, “it is arguable that it is the background conditions
that are the problem and not the offer that allows [the person] to improve on those
background conditions. The offer is still a positive good.”).
202. Curt S. Koontz & Joseph B. Cofer, What Price Should Be Paid for Organs?, 61
CURRENT SURGERY 419, 420 (2004) (reviewing the study of Indian kidney vendors by Goyal et
al., (see supra note 28) and noting that in light of the reality of a vibrant black market in third
world countries, “[Goyal’s] study could support the notion that developed countries . . . should
lead the way in setting standards for compensating ‘donors’. . . . Otherwise, donors may be
exploited and their health compromised in underdeveloped countries with a black market.”).
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kidneys are often obtained in ways that actively exploit the population (for
example, upfront cash donation without adequate information or follow-up
care),203 or are taken by force. In one recent case, the mastermind behind
a kidney procurement racket recruited men in India for construction work,
had them forcibly anesthetized, and then removed their kidneys without
consent for transplant into foreign recipients.204
Second, the family dynamic creates significant coercive pressure on
related donors,205 and shortages inherent in the current kidney procurement
system create pressures that coerce the participation of minor donors.
Desperate family members occasionally pressure small children or
incompetents to donate, and judges sign off on the donation as being in the
best interest of the donor, because of the familial relationship of the donor
to the recipient.206 Courts justify the use of children and incompetent family
members as organ suppliers because of the perception that there are no
other options. For example, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found a
fourteen year old girl with Down’s Syndrome could not voluntarily consent to
donating her kidney to her brother,207 nor could her mother consent for her
on the grounds that the donation was a therapeutic medical procedure that
benefited the donor.208 Nevertheless, the court upheld a trial court decision
allowing the donation on the grounds that the girl would receive substantial
psychological benefits from making the donation because it would preserve
the life of her brother, with whom she had a close relationship.209
The transplantation community is now recognizing the coercive effects
that some subordinate relationships might have on the potential donor, such

203. See supra Part IV.A.
204. Rama Lakshmi, India Uncovers Kidney Racket: Poor Laborers Were Victims of OrganTrafficking Network, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008, at A11 (reporting that the mastermind of a
recently disrupted Indian kidney racket “‘used to charge about 15 lakh rupees [$37,500] from
rich patients around the world and pay about 50,000 rupees [$1,270] to the laborer after
forcibly removing the kidney.’”).
205. See B. Larijani et al., Rewarded Gift for Living Renal Donors, 36 TRANSPLANTATION
PROC. 2539, 2540 (2004) (“The people who voluntarily donate an organ to a relative are
sometimes subject to greater coercion than those who sell their organs, because of internal
pressure and pressure from other family members to save the loved one.”).
206. Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 498-500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Strunk v. Strunk, 445
S.W.2d 145, 146, 149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969); Goodwin, The Body Market, supra note 10, at
635. But cf. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1344-45 (Ill. 1990) (denying the petition of
the noncustodial father of twin boys to have them tested for compatibility to donate bone
marrow to their half brother. The brother died before a donor could be found.).
207. Little, 576 S.W.2d at 493-95.
208. Id. at 495.
209. Id. at 500.
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as employer-employee or teacher-student,210 but in other cases they
underestimate the coercive effect of subordinate family relationships.211
C. The Scholarship Incentive Protects the Capacity to Consent
An oft-repeated refrain regarding markets for organs is that financial
incentives coerce behavior in a way that a regime of altruistic giving will
not.212 This claim has not gone undisputed,213 but let us assume that this
concern is valid at its extreme: an unrestricted cash-for-kidney system would
exert sufficient coercive pressure that poor people would allow themselves to
be exploited, and additionally miscalculate the risks involved in living
donation.214 This Part of the article argues that the coercive pressure which
may be inherent in a cash-for-kidney market system will be ameliorated by
the proposed scholarship regime.
1. Intertemporal choices and scholarship incentives
One recent study by neuroscientist Samuel McClure and his
collaborators suggests that the cognitive mechanisms of the brain explain
hyperbolic discounting.
The McClure study measured the cognitive
mechanisms of the brain, and found they respond differently to the promise
of immediate monetary reward than they do to temporally remote
benefits.215 When participants were offered a choice between an immediate
monetary reward and a greater reward at a future point in time, those
participants who selected the immediate reward displayed increased activity
in the limbic system, the part of the brain connected with impulse decisions
and addiction. When selecting between two monetary rewards at a future
point in time, where the reward closer in time was less than the reward
210. Dew et al., supra note 128, at 1048 (reporting the recommendations of seventy
transplantation professionals regarding psychological evaluations for nondirected altruistic
donors).
211. Id. at 1049 tbl.2 (identifying “[s]ubordinate relationship (e.g. employee/employer) or
other evidence of coercion” as a factor with “heightened importance for unrelated donors”).
The Dew Guidelines also express concern that nondirected donors are more likely to fall prey
to an exaggerated emotional appeal than directed donors, concluding that directed donors
were more likely to have made the decision to donate “against a backdrop of ongoing
education about treatment options and potential treatment outcomes.” Id. at 1049.
212. See, e.g., Holloway, supra note 110, at 153 (arguing that payment for organs would
result in the dehumanization and degradation of the poor, who are “the ones who need
money badly enough to resort to the sale of their own body parts.”).
213. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies,
and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1841 (2007) (arguing that the risks
involved with organ donation are not sufficient to justify the current ban).
214. Goyal et al., supra note 28, at 1591-92.
215. Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed
Monetary Rewards, 306 SCIENCE 503, 503 (2004).
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further in time, the selection process was correlated with increased activity in
the lateral prefrontal cortex, the posterior parietal cortex, and associated
structures, which are connected with the ability to plan, make abstract
decisions, and engage in rational deliberation.216 In addition, decisions
which were more difficult than others (where difficulty was measured by the
time it took to make the decision) tended to trigger more significant
responses from the prefrontal cortex structures.217 These findings suggest
that immediate cash compensation elicits impulse decisions in a way more
likely to impair decisional capacity than a delayed benefit like the proposed
scholarship incentive.
If this literature is correct, then the scholarship incentive would be, by its
nature, more likely to trigger prefrontal response mechanisms and less likely
to trigger responses in the limbic system, which are associated with impulse
decisions. However, the scholarship incentive also raises a particular
concern because of its admitted target population: “emerging adults,” the
population between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.218
2. Do emerging adults have the capacity to provide informed consent?
Donor age has increased over the past decade. Unfortunately, the
older the donor, the more likely that renal function has declined.219
Medically speaking, emerging adults are perfect donor candidates.220
However, emerging adult donors might also be thought to be more
susceptible to an unfair or coercive transaction than more mature adults.
The potential benefits that the proposed scholarship program would
provide the donor population can be illustrated in part by looking to the
various G.I. College Bills. There too, the typical beneficiaries are emerging
adults. The economic benefits of the G.I. Bill for society on the whole are
generally uncontested.221 Scholars estimate that the G.I. Bill returned

216. Id. at 504-05.
217. Id. at 505 & fig.2, 506 fig.3 (measuring in figure 3 significant increases in brain
activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the right
lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and the inferoparietal cortex).
218. Arnett, supra note 179, at 470-71.
219. McCauley et al., supra note 66, at 28.
220. Id. (“[T]he ideal potential donor is one who is young and in perfect health.”). The
lack of kidneys available through current procurement means has required relaxing standards
for what constitutes the ideal donor. Id. Thus, inasmuch as we increase living donation, we
may enable hospitals to be more selective, with the associated benefit that donors with poorer
health, and less likely to make a successful donation, are less likely to be selected for
donation.
221. MICHAEL J. BENNETT, WHEN DREAMS CAME TRUE: THE GI BILL AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 7 (1996) (“The GI Bill was the catalyst creating our present postcapitalist
society . . . .”); PETER F. DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 3 (1993) (identifying the G.I. Bill as
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something between five and twelve times the capital expended on it in terms
of tax revenues alone.222 While it is difficult to confidently unpack
educational benefits from the other benefits of the G.I. Bill, such as
subsidized mortgages for housing and low interest business loans,223 other
indicators suggest that education significantly increases the earning power
of the educated person over his or her uneducated peers, including an
average increase of nearly $18,000 in average yearly earning power over
the last two decades.224
On the other hand, the G.I. Bill is challenged on the grounds that its
modern educational benefits are insufficient compared to the risks of military
service, which fall disproportionately on persons of color.225 The concern
that educational benefits can impair the decisional capacity of emerging
adults is also reflected in other lines of scholarship, including the coercion
test utilized by the Supreme Court in Establishment Clause which looks both
to the age of those subject to a potentially coercive message and the
environment in which the exposure takes place.
There is a general concern that high school and college students are
more susceptible to religious coercion than older adults, who typically

a transformative event that helped usher in a “shift to the knowledge society[,]” and arguing
that perhaps nothing more important occurred in the twentieth century).
222. Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L.
REV. 515, 558 (2003). “The GI Bill fueled decades of growth through education expenditures
that significantly improved the quality of the nation’s human capital.” Id. at 571.
223. Id. at 557.
224. Comparing the average income for high school male graduates from 1990-2004
against the average income for a male graduate of a four-year college or university during the
same period shows an increase in average income from $31,039 per year ($465,583 over
15 years) to $48,940 per year ($734,099 over 15 years), a difference of $17,901. THOMAS
D. SNYDE ET AL., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2005, at 624 tbl.378 (2006).
225. See Merrily Davies, You Can’t Be All You Can Be if You Are Dead, COMMUNITY
ALLIANCE (Fresno, Cal.) Apr. 2006, at 15. Of course, the fact that a course of action falls
disproportionately upon minority populations does not mean that those populations should be
prevented from deciding whether the benefits are worth the risks. As Michele Goodwin writes
regarding organ donation, “African Americans are caught in a strange, conflicting matrix,
which calls them noble and generous if they surrender organs and blood without
compensation, but naïve, unsophisticated, and prone to exploitation and coercion if they are
compensated for undergoing a non-therapeutic organ removal. In addition to the racism
seemingly inherent in scholarship that casts Blacks as naïve or potentially criminal if they are
compensated for sharing organs, the discourse about organ and tissue procurement and
allocation regimes also often portrays African Americans as victims rather than recipients or
donors.” Goodwin, The Body Markets, supra note 10, at 607. See also WERTHEIMER, supra
note 200, at 111 (arguing in the realm of surrogate gestation, that “[i]f a woman can
reasonably regard surrogacy as improving her overall welfare given that society has unjustly
limited her options, it is arguable that it would be adding insult to injury to deny her that
opportunity.”).
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encounter religious messages outside of the academic setting.226 The
Supreme Court has turned to a “coercion test” for violations of the
Establishment Clause which looks both to the age of those potentially
subject to coercion, and the environment in which they are exposed to a
potentially coercive message.227 Courts have found that college students
are “uniquely susceptible to [religious] coercion” when faced with a religious
prayer in an academic setting,228 while participants exposed to prayer in a
legislative session were considered “not readily susceptible to ‘religious
indoctrination,’ . . . or peer pressure.”229
Scholars have also argued that athletic scholarships exploit college
athletes in a way more likely to harm Black athletes than White athletes,230
in part because Black athletes are more likely to be funneled into fields that
are unlikely to provide sufficient income after graduation.231 These
arguments suggest that the disadvantaged background of Black college
athletes allow for the exploitation of those athletes. That may be more

226. See Elizabeth B. Halligan, Note, Coercing Adults?: The Fourth Circuit and the
Acceptability of Religious Expression in Government Settings, 57 S.C. L. REV. 923, 936 (2006)
(noting that the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has keyed off the age
and maturity of those subject to a potentially coercive influence).
227. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000) (holding that a
student prayer at a school sponsored football game violated the Establishment Clause, in part
because such a sporting event was “part of a complete educational experience.”); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (holding that a prayer offered at a high school
graduation violated the Establishment Clause because the school district’s “supervision and
control . . . places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students . . . [which]
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”).
228. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371-72 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that supper
prayers at a military college violated the Establishment Clause, in part due to the coercive
atmosphere of the military college and in part due to the susceptibility of the students to
coercion).
229. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (holding that a prayer at the start of
a legislative session did not violate the Establishment Clause) (citations omitted).
230. Otis B. Grant, African American College Football Players and the Dilemma of
Exploitation, Racism and Education: A Socio-Economic Analysis of Sports Law, 24 WHITTIER L.
REV. 645, 649 (2003) (reporting that while African American college football players
“successfully bargained for a free education in exchange for playing football . . . they do not
graduate on par with their White counterparts . . . [which] means that on average, most
African American players do not benefit from their ‘bargained-for exchange’”).
231. The False Promise of Black Athletic Scholarships, 6 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Winter
1994-1995, at 36, 36-37 (noting that “many [Black] student athletes are enrolled in college
simply to play basketball. Many go through the motions of college instruction (often with the
complicity of the administration, faculty, and coaching staff) so they will maintain their athletic
eligibility. Only 35 percent of black male basketball players on athletic scholarships at NCAA
Division I institutions go on to earn a diploma.”).
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stereotype than substance.232 Nevertheless, it would be odd to suggest the
correct solution to the exploitation of college athletes is to prevent them
from receiving any benefit from the scholarship program, or to require
athletes to donate their time and skills without any scholarship benefits at all.
If there are concerns about the coercive effects of scholarship benefits, then
the experience of college athletes teaches two things. First, the scholarship
incentive must provide opportunities for academic success. This suggests
that the proposed scholarship program ought not affect admissions to a
particular institution, but instead ought to pay for schooling at an institution
where the donor was admitted on merit, but would otherwise be unlikely or
unable to attend because of cost. Second, there is reason to think the
scholarship incentive ought to include academic counseling, and perhaps
tutoring, to assure that donors who receive the opportunity for education are
equipped to make the most of it.
The aforementioned concerns are due in part to the youth of those who
typically consider educational opportunities or are involved in educational
Some recent scientific data suggests that risk taking
institutions.233
behaviors do not peak at the end of adolescence, generally at age eighteen
to nineteen,234 but instead during emerging adulthood.235 Restrictions on

232. Compare Tommy Craggs, Where They Come From, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, Feb. 25,
2008, at 50 (study finding that the childhood home of the average NBA basketball player
spent his formative years in a hometown that was medium-sized, middle-class, diverse, and as
educated as the United States as a whole), with DARCY FREY, THE LAST SHOT: CITY STREETS,
BASKETBALL DREAMS 13-15, 22-24, 30, 32 (1994) (documenting the difficult background of
four high school students from Coney Island who struggled to meet the academic
requirements to play in the NCAA).
233. See, e.g., Sarah M. Lavigne, Comment, Education Funding in Maine in Light of
Zelman and Locke: Too Much Play in the Joints?, 59 ME. L. REV. 511, 523 n.82 (2007)
(noting that some programs allow school voucher funds to go to religious schools so long as
the schools agree “‘not to compel any student attending the private school [by benefit of the
voucher program] to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, or to worship.’”) (alteration
in original) (citing FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(4)(j) (repealed 2003)); Hanlon, supra note 174, at
69-74 (describing the inequitable bargaining power between universities and athletic
departments who control athletic scholarships and the athletes who depend on them).
234. Arnett, supra note 179, at 476 (“[C]ontemporary scholars generally consider
adolescence to begin at age 10 or 11 and to end by age 18 or 19.”).
235. Craig M. Bennett & Abigail A. Baird, Anatomical Changes in the Emerging Adult
Brain: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study, 27 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 766, 766-67 (2006)
(reporting that the brains of college freshmen who have moved at least 100 miles from home
to attend college evidence anatomical changes which support the finding that emerging adults
continue to mature developmentally between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five); Jerald G.
Bachman et al., Transitions in Drug Use During Late Adolescence and Young Adulthood, in
TRANSITIONS THROUGH ADOLESCENCE: INTERPERSONAL DOMAINS AND CONTEXT 111, 117-18 &
fig.5.3 (Julia A. Graber et al. eds., 1996) (reporting on data indicating that rates of binge
drinking among reported subjects peak at age twenty-one to twenty-two and do not fall below
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certain privileges for those in the emerging adulthood phase—for example,
legally purchasing or consuming alcohol, or renting an automobile236—
implies that many individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five
are not to be fully vested with the autonomy of decision making that society
vests in older persons.
Decisional capacity is not tied to a hard and fast age limit. As current
science recognizes, some individuals evidence the ability to make rational
decisions and take responsibility for their health and welfare at an earlier
In fact, some scholarship suggests that while
age than others.237
adolescents in their late teens do not make risk assessments in the way that
an adult would,238 they are benefited by opportunities to weigh information
and make decisions for themselves.239

pre-adolescent levels until age twenty-eight to twenty-nine). One possible explanation for the
spike in binge drinking at the age of twenty-one is that alcohol is first legally available to
emerging adults when they turn twenty-one. While binge drinking is certainly a risky behavior,
perhaps it shows a certain amount of foresight that some young adults wait until they are
legally of age before they engage in such behavior.
236. Arthur J. Matas, Ethics of Paid Living-Unrelated Donation: The Case for a Regulated
System of Kidney Sales, in LIVING DONOR TRANSPLANTATION, 418, 424-25 (Henkie P. Tan et al.
eds., 2007).
237. See Sandra Hoffmann, Since Children Are Not Little Adults—Socially—What’s an
Environmental Economist to Do?, 17 DUKE ENV. L. & POL’Y F. 209, 222-25 (2007) (discussing
that some children learn to assess expected outcomes earlier than other children).
238. Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youths’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 139, 161-62 (Thomas
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2003) (reporting on recent studies indicating that
adolescents may differ from adults in underestimating the possible losses of their behavior,
and that young adolescents, or adolescents with low IQ scores will tend to weigh short term
benefits more heavily than long term benefits).
239. Paul Arshagouni, “But I’m an Adult Now . . . Sort Of”: Adolescent Consent in Health
Care Decision-Making and the Adolescent Brain, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 315, 323-24
(2006) (suggesting that an inability to project future circumstances might actually militate in
favor of expanding the rights of youth to privacy in their medical decisions, and in their rights
to consent to medical procedures independent of their parents as a means for fostering
responsible behavior and decision making); EUGEEN VERHELLEN, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD 27-29 (3d ed., 2000) (arguing that observation of children, especially in wartorn or chaotic regions, provides evidence that they are capable of participating as fullfledged members of society with rights and freedoms, and that their capacity for selfdetermination should be recognized because that will allow them the opportunity to develop
that capacity); Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to
Cognitive Dissonance in the Law’s View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY
L.J. 65, 96, 101-02 (1999) (noting that the social science data of the day provided at least
provisional support for the proposition that adolescents aged seventeen and above possess
the same capacity to make significant life decisions as adults, while recognizing they might
reach different decisions than the adults).
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One recent brain morphometry study demonstrated measurable
changes in the brain structure of college freshmen who moved at least 100
miles away from home to attend college.240 The changes occurred in parts
of the brain associated with the ability to “integrate diverse sensory
components for use in higher-order [decisionmaking] processes.”241 The
study was inconclusive regarding whether the significant changes in the
environment triggered the growth of brain structure, or whether the growth
was “a result of a predetermined neurodevelopmental trajectory”.242 Some
research indicates that changes in environment alter brain structures,243
which might indicate that undertaking new experiences and making difficult
decisions increases the capacity to make difficult decisions.244 Other
scholars have suggested that because “impulsive behavior and risk-taking
associated with late adolescence does not begin to stabilize until the midtwenties,”245 both marriage and the decision to start a family might be
contraindicated until the period of emerging adolescence has ended.246
Science is thus inconclusive on the ability of emerging adults to correctly
ascertain risk, but the law is fairly uniform in presuming decisional capacity
on the part of those who reach the age of majority, and in some
circumstances, even younger. Mature-minor statutes indicate that even
adolescents younger than eighteen should be, and are, allowed to make
medical decisions for themselves when they evidence sufficient capacity.
Some states adopt a rule of sevens, treating minors under seven years of
age as having no capacity to consent, minors between seven and fourteen
as under a rebuttable presumption of no capacity, and minors between
fourteen and eighteen as under a rebuttable presumption of capacity.247 In

240. Bennett & Baird, supra note 235, at 767.
241. Id. at 774.
242. Id. at 775.
243. Id. at 775 (citing Sara L. Bengtsson et al., Extensive Piano Practicing Has Regionally
Specific Effects on White Matter Development, 8 NAT. NEUROSCIENCE 1148 passim (2005)
(explaining that musical training at an early age is an important factor behind the
development of high-level abilities in other domains)); Bogdan Draganski et al., Changes in
Grey Matter Induced by Training, 427 NATURE 311, 311 (2004) (reporting findings that
indicate that “learning-induced cortical plasticity is also reflected at a structural level.”);
Eleanor A. Maguire et al., Navigation-Related Structural Change in the Hippocampi of Taxi
Drivers, 97 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 4398, 4399 (2000) (noting an increase in gray
matter volume in the brains of taxi drivers).
244. VERHELLEN, supra note 239, at 27-29.
245. Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Red Families V. Blue Families 4 (The Geo. Wash.
Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 343, Aug. 16, 2007), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paperss.cfm?abstract_id=1008544 (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Miller ex rel. Miller v. Dacus, 231 S.W.3d 903, 908 (Tenn. 2007) (finding
that a minor aged seventeen years, seven months was a “mature minor” who could provide
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most jurisdictions, a minor may be granted a “mature minor” exception to
the requirement that an adult approve medical treatment for a minor
child.248 As Rhonda Gay Hartman has noted, the “paramount consideration
[of state legislatures] in enacting these state statutes has been increasing
recognition of adolescent decisional ability in light of the opinions of health
care professionals who deem it appropriate to treat an adolescent in the
absence of parental or guardian authority.”249
State marriage laws also recognize the capacity of emerging adults to
make critical decisions influencing their futures. Every state but one250
allows adults of eighteen years of age to obtain a marriage license without
parental consent or court approval.251 Some of those states also allow
minors under the age of eighteen to obtain a marriage license without
parental consent with approval of a court.252
The law allows youth of eighteen years to volunteer for military service,
to vote, to drive, to stand trial as an adult, and to be considered
independent from their parents without any intervention of the state. Taking
those capacities as data points, it appears that eighteen is old enough to
informed consent to a medical procedure, and to whom medical treatment may be provided
without obtaining parental consent) (citing Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 755 (Tenn.
1987)).
248. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748, 755 (noting that under Tennessee law, “the capacity
[of a minor] to consent to medical treatment depends upon the age, ability, experience,
education, training, and degree of maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, . . . the
conduct and demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident involved . . . [, as well as] the
nature of the treatment and its risks or probable consequences, and the minor's ability to
appreciate the risks and consequences . . . .”); AHRONHEIM ET AL., supra note 183, at 32
(reporting that the mature minor exception grants decision making authority at around age
fifteen, based on fact-specific circumstances).
249. Hartman, supra note 142, at 1311.
250. Mississippi is the only state that does not automatically allow eighteen year olds to
obtain a marriage license. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(a) (2008) requires that if the female
applicant for a marriage license is under the age of twenty-one and a resident of the state,
then the application must be made in the county where the applicant resides, and must
include the names and addresses of the female applicant’s parents or next of kin. Id. In
addition, the application is subject to a three-day waiting period, which can be waived by a
judge. Id. § 93-1-5(b). The county clerk is also required by law to inform parents if either
party “appears from the evidence to be under twenty-one (21) years of age . . . .” Id.
251. NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 434-38 tbl.29 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 5th ed. 2005)
(reporting that in Mississippi, the minimum legal age to marry without parental consent is
twenty-one).
252. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-108 (2008) (granting authority to the juvenile
court to order the county clerk and the recorder to issue a marriage license to a party aged
sixteen or seventeen years even if a parent or guardian has not provided consent, so long as a
reasonable effort has been made to notify the parents, and the court “finds that the underage
party is capable of assuming the responsibilities of marriage and the marriage would serve his
best interests.”).
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determine whether donating a kidney is a prudent choice for the donor,
especially given evidence that indicates the limited health risk of living
donation.253 This is particularly true when comparing kidney donation to
military service, which poses significant risks to soldiers.254 If it is acceptable
to let high school students hear a recruitment pitch and enlist when they turn
eighteen, it should be acceptable from a risk assessment perspective to
allow them to gather information about the risks involved with kidney
donation and make a commitment to donate when they turn eighteen. It
should be noted that while the current donation regime requires a court
order to allow donation from those under the age of eighteen, there is a
strong legal presumption that once a donor has reached the age of

253. See R. Pretagostini et al., Survival in Kidney Transplantation from Living Donors: A
Single-Center Experience, 36 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 467, 467-68 (2004) (reporting no
perioperative mortality among a study of 600 donors); Thiagarajan Ramcharan & Arthur J.
Matas, Long-Term (20–37 Years) Follow-Up of Living Kidney Donors, 2 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 959, 959-60 (2002) (reporting that in a population of 380 living donors still
alive at the time of the study, the majority of donors had normal renal function 20-37 years
post donation, and of 84 living donors who had since died, only 3 were known to have died
of kidney failure); Eric M. Johnson et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Living Kidney Donors:
Quality of Life After Donation, 67 TRANSPLANTATION 717, 717-19 (1999) (reporting that in a
survey of 524 living donors whose surgery occurred at the University of Minnesota between
1984 and 1996, the majority of donors reported good quality of life, that donation was little
or no financial burden, that problems with health insurance were not stressful or only a little
stressful, and that they did not regret donating); R. Saran et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of
Kidney Donors: A Longitudinal Study, 12 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 1615, 1616,
1620 (1997) (finding among a group of 47 kidney donors that renal function appears
relatively well preserved 20 to 30 years after donation). Eugene Volokh reports that living
donors face approximately the same yearly risk of death as those working as long-haul truck
drivers. Volokh, supra note 213, at 1841-42. See also Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145,
149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (noting that upon donating a kidney, the statistical life expectancy of
a healthy 35 year old adult drops from 99.3% to 99.1% during the next 5 succeeding years,
equivalent to the risk “incurred by driving a car for 16 miles every working day . . . .”) (internal
citation omitted). Note as well that the numbers reported in Strunk were from 1969. Medical
care for donors has significantly improved in the past forty years.
254. See, e.g., GULF WAR AND HEALTH: PHYSIOLOGIC, PSYCHOLOGIC, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL
EFFECTS OF DEPLOYMENT-RELATED STRESS 248-58 (Inst. of Med., Nat. Acad. ed., 6th ed. 2008)
(cataloguing the health risks accompanying military service); Military Service Doubles Suicide
Risk, SCIENCE DAILY, June 12, 2007, at www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/06/07061207
5148.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (reporting that the suicide rate of soldiers who saw
combat is twice that of the general population); contra Samuel H. Preston & Emily Buzzell,
Service in Iraq: Just How Risky?, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2006, at A21 (noting that while the
death rate for U.S. men aged 18-39 in 2003 was 1.53 per 1,000 person years—39% of
which was due to the deaths of troops in Iraq (3.92 deaths per 1,000 person years)—that
number is less than the risk of death for Black youth in Philadelphia (4.37 per 1,000 person
years in 2002)).
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majority,255 “specific evidence of incapacity is required to call into question
an adult’s empowerment to make his or her own decisions.”256 The
scientific evidence does not sufficiently call into question the decisional
capacity of donors who have reached the age of majority, so as a legal
matter, the presumption of capacity for donors over the age of eighteen
should hold true.257
If further studies solidify the intuition that emerging adults lack decisional
capacity, the proposed scholarship incentive could be restricted to more
mature students, perhaps providing scholarship incentives for law, medical,
business, or other graduate students.258 Like an undergraduate scholarship
program, a graduate scholarship incentive could provide large benefits for a
student who is concerned about the ability to pay for the loans accrued at
high end schools.259 Such an orientation may not provide enough incentive

255. See, e.g., Vivek Sharma et al., Pediatric Living-Donor Kidney Transplantation, in
LIVING DONOR TRANSPLANTATION 149, 151 (Henkie P. Tan et al. eds., 2007) (noting that in
exceptional cases, a court order can allow a donation to go forward when it involves a donor
under the age of eighteen).
256. AHRONHEIM ET AL., supra note 183, at 29.
257. It should be noted that individual OPOs have differing policies for the acceptable
minimum age of nondirected donors. For example, the transplant center at the University of
Minnesota rejects nondirected donors who are younger than twenty-one. Cheryl L. Jacobs et
al., Twenty-Two Nondirected Kidney Donors: An Update on a Single Center’s Experience, 4
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1110, 1111 (2004) (reporting that the center rejected 3 potential
nondirected donors out of 360 interested callers because they were under the age of 21). The
center explained the decision to raise its minimum age from 18 to 21, noting that “[t]he few
inquirers who were under 21 years had either voiced parental concerns about donating or
avoided telling their parents altogether for fear of their disapproval or anger. Therefore, we
were concerned about possible family stress, lack of support after donation, and donor
vulnerability during recovery.” Id. at 1114.
258. Stanford University’s Career Development Center reports that the average age of a
first-year law student is twenty-four. Stanford University Career Development Center, Law
Overview, at http://cardinalcareers.stanford.edu/law/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). The average
age of first year business students “at the top business schools” is twenty-seven. Yahoo!
Education, Admissions to Business School, at http://education.yahoo.com/college/essentials/
articles/biz/bschool-admissions.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). The ages of the 2008
incoming class at Harvard Medical School ranged from twenty-one to thirty-six. Harvard
Medical School, Admissions FAQs, at http://hms.harvard.edu/admissions/default.asp?page
=admissions (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
259. Medical school graduates carry an average post-graduation debt of $130,571.
Editorial, Repair Student Loan Repayment Law: A Federal Legislative Change in How Medical
School Graduates Repay Their Loans Leaves Residents in a Financial Pinch, AM. MED. NEWS,
Nov. 19. 2007, at www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/11/19/edsa1119.htm (last visited
Apr. 9, 2009). First year associate lawyers typically bear a debt from undergraduate and law
school of $80,000. Am. Bar Ass’n, 2006 Legislative Priorities: Student Loan Forgiveness, at
www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/student_loan.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) [hereinafter
Student Loan Forgiveness].
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however, for many students at top tier legal, medical, and business schools,
where starting salaries after graduation have historically been sufficient to
quickly pay down loans. In the field of law, for instance, compensation for
starting attorneys at some blue chip law firms is $160,000, and partner pay
can top $1 million.260 When contrasted with the salary range of the typical
government lawyer ($43,300 to $46,300 in 2006) or legal services attorney
($36,000 in 2006),261 it is obvious that the scholarship incentive highlights
a troubling trend and might raise questions of coercion.262 If attorneys
committed to public interest work are most likely to take advantage of the
scholarship incentive to avoid crushing loan repayments, then the
scholarship incentive would be vulnerable to the criticism that it enables
lawyers to engage in public interest law, but only if those public minded
lawyers are literally willing to “sell a kidney” to do it. There would also be a
concern that limiting participation to students in professional programs
might restrict the potential donor population to such an extent that it could
not meet the need for transplantable kidneys.263
3. The scholarship incentive encourages informed consent
The proposed scholarship incentive differs from a cash-for-kidneys
regime sufficiently to limit the potential harms caused by an unrestricted
market regime. First, the scholarship program is a system of delayed
compensation, providing a benefit that cannot be transferred into quick
cash, but which is more likely than a simple cash donation to provide longterm benefits to donors. Second, while there are concerns that collegeaged individuals are particularly susceptible to financial coercion and to
misapprehend the risks involved with various courses of action, the
proposed scholarship can be structured to respond to some of those
concerns.
Donating a kidney is not like getting a tattoo or maxing out one’s credit
cards. The informed consent procedures currently in place, combined with
the time necessary to match donors with recipients,264 provides a certain

260. Lisa Lerer, The Scourge of the Billable Hour: Could Law-Firm Clients Finally Kill It Off?,
SLATE, Jan. 2, 2008, at www.slate.com/id/2180420/fr/rss/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
261. Charles Toutant, Public Interest Law Jobs Still Paying Peanuts, LAW.COM, Sept. 12,
2006, at www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1157978115780 (last visited Apr.
9, 2009).
262. The ABA notes that “[o]nly those students with debt burdens [in the $40,000 range]
tend to enter public interest positions.” Student Loan Forgiveness, supra note 259.
263. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
264. The Kidney Foundation of Canada suggests that the process to determine if an
individual can donate a kidney takes between three to six months. The Kidney Found. of
Canada, Living Kidney Donation—Frequently Asked Questions, at www.kidneyfoundation.ab.
ca/Be_Involved/FAQ%20Live%20Donation.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). The transplant
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check on impulse decisions. For example, in one reported study, the
University of Minnesota screened 142 nondirected donors for transplant,
rejecting 23 donors (16%) for medical reasons and another 15 (11%) for
nonmedical reasons.265 In fact, unlike the gentleman applying ink at the
local tattoo parlor, medical professionals tend to be overcautious in
verifying that the donor is truly willing to donate—going so far as to provide
potential recipients with last minute excuses of incompatibility if the donor
gets cold feet,266 or reject adult donors who seem too media focused, or
whose immediate family is concerned that the donation is not fully
voluntary.267
There are risks that the proposed scholarship program might prey on
underprivileged populations, as critics claim military recruiting preys on
vulnerable high school populations.268 Military recruiters are effectively in
the position of counseling high school students about a life-altering

center at the University of Florida Shands Hospital suggests that it takes four to eight weeks to
match a donor with a recipient. UF & Shands Jacksonville Transplantation, Kidney
Transplantation, at http://jax.shands.org/hs/transplantation/services.asp#kidney (last visited
Apr. 9, 2009).
265. Adams, supra note 128, at 585 (citing C. Jacobs et al., Nondirected Donation: Who
Volunteers? Who is Rejected?, 1 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 249 (2001)). See also L.
Kranenburg et al., The Psychological Evaluation of Samaritan Kidney Donors: A Systematic
Review, 38 PSYCHOL. MED. 177, 177-78 (2007) (reporting that psychological evaluation is a
standard part of the donor evaluation procedure).
A national conference of the
transplantation community held in 2001 defined several categories of “unacceptable donor
expectations” about transplantation, including the desire for media attention, a desire by the
donor to select the recipient by gender, race, or ethnicity, or a desired involvement in the
recipient’s life after donation. Adams, supra note 128, at 585.
266. Joel D. Kallich & Jon F. Merz, The Transplant Imperative: Protecting Living Donors
from the Pressure to Donate, 20 J. CORP. L. 139, 152 (1995) (reporting that physicians
“[o]ccasionally . . . provide a technical excuse (such as a poor match) for potential donors
expressing their desires not to proceed with the act.”); Arthur L. Caplan, Am I My Brother’s
Keeper?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1195, 1205 (1993) (arguing that for consent to be valid, the
donor must be able to withdraw consent, meaning that “physicians seeking consent must be
willing to provide a ‘cover story’ or some form of ‘medical excuse’ for the prospective donor
should the donor refuse or withdraw their consent.”); Michael J. Saks, Social Psychological
Perspectives on the Problem of Consent, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 41, 49 (Gary
B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) (reporting that doctors often use the excuse of incompatibility to
shield a prospective donor from family pressure if the intended donor chooses not to donate).
267. Parents of a potential donor, a member of the religious group called the Jesus
Christians, contacted North American transplant centers and raised questions about the
donor's ability to provide informed consent to the kidney procedure. A hospital in Toronto
where the donor's transplant was scheduled rejected him as a donor on the grounds that he
was “motivated by the desire for publicity . . . not by altruism.” Meckler, supra note 127.
268. Davies, supra note 225, at 15 (reporting that recruiters provide aggressive sales
pitches regarding the educational benefits from military service while underselling the
possibility of going to war).
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decision, and critics argue that they provide less than complete information
in part because they are so keen to recruit. However, there is no reason to
think that recruiting for the scholarship program need be as aggressive as
military recruiting is perceived to be. Indeed, it would be a breach of
medical ethics to fail to provide a prospective donor with the information
necessary to make an informed decision.269 At minimum, the scholarship
program should put a firm cap of eighteen as the minimum age to donate a
kidney. This should ameliorate some of the inherent risks regarding the
arguably limited judgment of potential donors. In addition, all information
necessary to meet informed consent requirements under rules of medical
ethics should be provided to prospective donors after they reach a minimum
age of eighteen. One additional safeguard for donors would be to provide
the prospective donor with her own doctor, unassociated with the transplant
team, to avoid any potential unconscious pressure on the part of the
surgeon to coerce consent.
V. STATUTORY OBSTACLES TO THE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
The final obstacle to the scholarship incentive is statutory: the incentive is
against the law under the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) and
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA). Specifically, a scholarship is likely
valuable consideration for a donated kidney donation creates a valuable
consideration, and it is a felony under NOTA to offer or receive anything of
value in exchange for a kidney. While this article has argued that the
scholarship program is likely to be palatable as a means of providing
financial incentives for organ donation, as well as effective at increasing the
incidence of living donation, there are statutory provisions that make the
program difficult to realize. NOTA prohibits the transfer of any organ,
including kidneys,270 “for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”271 Any kidney
shipped across state lines would be subject to that prohibition. In addition,
the transfer of kidneys through intrastate activity is governed by the UAGA,
parts of which have been adopted in one form or another by all fifty

269. Mark Unruh et al., Evaluation: Specific Issues for Living-Donor Kidney Transplantation,
in LIVING DONOR TRANSPLANTATION 33, 45 (Henkie P. Tan et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the
various health risks implicated by living donation of a kidney, and asserting that both medical
professionals and the prospective donor have the responsibility to insure that the donor has
“an acceptable risk profile”); Adams, supra note 128, at 582 (“Transplant centers that accept
[nondirected donors] should document an informed consent process that details donor risks,
assures donor safety, and determines that the goals and expectations of the [nondirected
donor] and the recipient can be realized.”).
270. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000).
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states,272 which prohibits “a person that for valuable consideration
knowingly purchases or sells a part for transplantation or therapy if removal
of a part from an individual is intended to occur after the individual’s
death”.273 Both statutes provide criminal penalties for the transfer of kidneys
for valuable consideration.274
These provisions create a substantial obstacle to the proposed
scholarship program because as a statutory matter, scholarships are
considered valuable consideration if there is a quid pro quo involved,275
i.e., “any amount received which represents payment for teaching, research,
or other services by the student required as a condition for receiving the
qualified scholarship”.276 Altering the scholarship plan to a repayment or
reimbursement of student loans would not correct this problem, as they, too,
are considered taxable income, or valuable consideration,277 more a
bargained-for exchange than a no-strings attached grant.278 Even thirdparty payments would provide no relief.279
Thus, under the current statutory framework, living donors would be
liable for fines and jail time if they accepted a scholarship or loan
forgiveness in return for donating a kidney, and any organization offering
such a scholarship or loan forgiveness would also be criminally liable.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that a scholarship is always
valuable consideration and taxable income whenever there is a quid pro
quo involved. As discussed in Part III.C, supra, athletic scholarships are
treated by the IRS as if there were no quid pro quo involved in playing
college athletics.280 It is unclear why the IRS persists in embracing the legal

272. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies to Declaratory Judgments § 86 (2003).
273. REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 16 (2008).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2000); REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 16(a) (2008).
275. The Supreme Court embraced the “quid pro quo” test as the correct metric to
measure whether a scholarship should be treated as tax-exempt, or instead as taxable income.
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 757-58 (1969) (finding that a grant given to a taxpayer by
the taxpayer’s employer to enable research and writing, where the taxpayers was obligated to
return to the employer after the research period, is a bargained-for exchange rather than a
no-strings attached grant and thus properly taxable).
276. I.R.C. § 117(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2005).
277. I.R.C. § 108(f)(3) (2000). There are exceptions to treating educational loan
forgiveness as income, but those exceptions would not apply to the proposed scholarship
incentive.
278. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 757-58.
279. Joseph M. Dodge, Scholarships Under the Income Tax, 46 TAX LAW. 697, 725 (1993)
(“[C]ompensation received directly or indirectly from third parties (as might occur in the case
of internships) would on no account be excluded under section 117.”).
280. See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 states
that athletic scholarships are not taxable income because the university requires no particular
activity of any of its scholarship recipients. Although students who receive athletic scholarships
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fiction that athletic scholarships are unconnected to any services required
from the recipient-athlete, but perhaps the Service does so because there
would be no other way to preserve the tax-exempt status of athletic
scholarships under the quid pro quo test. Such a determination provides a
legal opening for the proposed scholarship incentive: sometimes a
scholarship granted as part of a bargained-for exchange is treated as a taxexempt gift instead of valuable consideration. This is a weak limb on which
to hang the hopes of the proposed scholarship incentive, but it does provide
a framework for discussion. If fielding a basketball team, generating
revenue, and recruiting for a university is a goal sufficient to justify special
tax-exempt treatment of a bargained-for exchange, then providing a
scholarship that will increase the needed supply of kidneys, thereby
extending the lives of recipients and improving the quality of those lives,
might merit the same type of special treatment.281
Tax scholar Joseph M. Dodge suggests that where a scholarship
includes valuable consideration—i.e., a graduate student teaching courses
for the university—the value of the services provided is correctly taxable, and
scholarship value in excess of those services should be tax-exempt.282
Consider a graduate student who received a $10,000 scholarship, and was
required to teach a course as a condition for receiving the scholarship. If
other teachers were paid $4,000 for the same work, then $4,000 of the
graduate student’s scholarship would be taxable income, and the remaining
$6,000 would be tax exempt. Applying the same logic to the proposed
kidney scholarship incentive, kidneys cannot be sold on the open market,
and the transplantation industry treats them as if they had a value of $0.
Thus, the entire value of the scholarship award should be tax-exempt
because there is no value in the service provided—donating a kidney.
Unlike teaching at the university, there would be no valuable proxy for the
kidney, as it cannot be sold or even overtly assigned value when transferred
from one entity in the procurement process to another. This argument is a
sleight-of-hand of sorts, given that the thrust of this article is to argue that
the donation of a kidney is properly worth the value of a college education
do so because of their special abilities in a particular sport and are expected to participate in
the sport, the scholarship is not cancelled in the event the student cannot participate and the
student is not required to engage in any other activities in lieu of participating in the sport.
281. Indeed, Michele Goodwin argues for a waiver of the criminal sanctions in NOTA, in
order to facilitate attempts by states to work out a successful program for partial
commodification. Goodwin, The Body Market, supra note 10, at 633. Such a waiver would
allow states to try out the scholarship incentive proposed in this article. Part II, supra provides
the justification for allowing the attempt.
282. Dodge, supra note 279, at 724. Dodge proposes a hypothetical where the graduate
student is provided with a $10,000 scholarship by the university. As part of the qualification
for the scholarship, the student teaches courses for the university. Id.
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to the donor, to the party paying for the recipient’s dialysis, and perhaps to
society at large. But so long as the structure of organ procurement laws
maintains the legal fiction that there can be no market value for a donated
organ, the tax laws which would otherwise treat the scholarship received as
a bargained-for exchange for a donated kidney might justify an analogous
legal fiction to shield the scholarship incentive from liability under NOTA
and the UAGA.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article provides an opening volley in favor of a scholarship program
to stimulate the living donation of kidneys. There remains work to be done
in this area. A more focused study on the rhetorical function of scholarship
benefits, as well as an empirical study of how a potential scholarship
incentive would be received is necessary. The discussion of the potential
coercive effect of scholarships is also nascent, and empirical work in that
area would be exceedingly valuable. Nevertheless, I am optimistic that a
scholarship regime could safely negotiate the space between altruistic
symbolism and economic reality, and effect a positive, lasting change in
both the lives of those waiting for kidneys and those looking for educational
opportunities.

